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The Off-Label Loophole in the 
Psychopharmacologic Setting: 
Prescription of Antipsychotic 
Drugs in the Nonpsychotic 
Patient Population 
Lisa E. Smilan† 
Abstract 
 U.S. physicians have wide discretion in treating patients with 
off-label medications. Many consider off-label prescription 
essential in our country’s health care system, and it is wholly 
supported by FDA and federal courts. Assumptions about 
physicians’ expertise, judgments, and commitments to 
beneficence and nonmaleficence undergird laissez-faire policies 
that allow and support physicians’ novel and innovate uses of 
FDA-approved drugs for purposes and populations not studied in 
original, strictly regulated clinical trials. Though sometimes 
beneficial, off-label prescribing, which flourishes in private-
practice psychiatry, often harms scores of psychiatric patients. 
Frequently, potential harms are insufficiently disclosed to 
patients. In the public health sector, officials have begun to 
identify and warn of dangers surrounding antipsychotic use in 
nonpsychotic foster children. Within the government-funded  
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insurance apparatus there are built-in means for checking harmful 
physician practices. Such oversight mechanisms are deficient in 
the private insurance sector, and absent where treatment is paid 
for out-of-pocket. The Article proposes that private-practice 
psychiatrists’ collective widespread “experimental” treatment of 
nonpsychotic patients with antipsychotics off label resembles 
clinical research without regulation or meaningful accountability. 
Because harmful physician practices in the off-label 
antipsychotics space are largely unchecked by state regulation 
and law, action is required to protect some of our most vulnerable 
patients. 
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Introduction 
It is notable that consent is required of participants in a 
drug trial because the drug’s effects have yet to be shown, 
but consent is not required for a drug prescribed in a 
clinical setting for a purpose that has not been fully studied. 
. . . Without a clear stance taken by the legal 
establishment, the medical establishment is less able to set 
up a model of best practice on this issue and has less 
incentive to do so.1 
While other specialists and general practice physicians are 
moving towards collaborating and conferring within partnerships 
 
1. Zain Mithani, Informed Consent for Off-Label Use of Prescription 
Medications, 14 AMA J. ETHICS 576, 578 (2012) (citing David C. 
Radley et al., Off-label Prescribing Among Office-based Physicians, 
166 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1021 (2006)). 
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or other business entities, the majority of office-based 
psychiatrists are in practice alone. A study analyzing data from 
a national survey of U.S. office-based physicians2 revealed that 
private fee-for-service insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid 
acceptance rates by psychiatrists were significantly lower than 
acceptance rates of other specialist physicians.3 Psychiatrists 
practicing alone were less likely to accept any type of insurance.4 
Without input from colleagues and oversight by insurance 
companies, psychiatrists are positioned to be practicing in 
isolation. 
Individual psychiatrists may believe they are treating 
individual patients, but the collective behavior of individual 
psychiatrists has led to widespread prescription of antipsychotic 
drugs to classes of vulnerable patients who are not psychotic. This 
may not be the intent of the independent psychiatrist, but 
nonetheless it is the outcome and cause for great concern. 
Widespread off-label use of antipsychotics adversely affects not 
only the individual patients, but results in additional healthcare 
expenditures to treat “side-effect” illnesses (including the use of 
additional costly medications to treat those illnesses).5 
Additionally, unnecessary antipsychotic prescription can 
 
2. Tara F. Bishop et al., Acceptance of Insurance by Psychiatrists and 
the Implications for Access to Mental Health Care, 71 JAMA 
PSYCHIATRY 176, 179 (2014). 
3. Id. By percentage, in 2009–10 the rate of psychiatrists who accepted 
private fee-for-service insurance was much lower than that 
representing acceptance by other specialists (55.3% versus 88.7%); 
and that 2009–10 rate showed a decline of 17.0% compared to 2005–
06. The percentage of psychiatrists accepting Medicare in 2009–10 
was significantly lower than other specialists (54.8% versus 86.1%), 
declining by 19.5% from 2005–06. Psychiatrists’ Medicaid 
acceptance rates were lower than other specialists in 2009–10 
(43.1% vs. 73.0%), but remained relatively stable compared to 
2005–06 rates. Id. 
4. Id. 43.0% of solo practitioners accepted private fee-for-service 
insurance compared to 74.9% of those who practiced in groups; 
45.0% of solo practitioners accepted Medicare compared to 69.5% 
of those who practiced in groups; and 26.8% of solo practitioners 
accepted Medicaid compared to 67.3% of those who practiced in 
groups. Id. In 2009–10, nearly half of psychiatrists did not accept 
private fee-for-service insurance, and over half did not accept either 
Medicare or Medicaid. Id. 
5. See Nevena Divac et al., Second-Generation Antipsychotics and 
Extrapyramidal Adverse Effects, BIOMED RES. INT’L 1, 2 (2014). 
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adversely affect productivity of patients and reduce earning 
potential. The Hippocratic mandate to “do no harm” is 
implicated here,6 however, that mandate is sometimes distorted 
by a narrow focus on the present and not the future. For example, 
a “quick fix” to quell a patient’s mind or alleviate depression may 
lead to a lifetime of drug-induced physical ailments. 
The policy of allowing individual physicians to prescribe off 
label for unapproved diseases and unapproved patient groups 
derives from several assumptions about the profession, for 
example, that all physicians: (1) are exceptionally intelligent and 
intuitive; (2) share information and decision-making with 
patients; (3) listen to patients’ concerns; (4) engage in 
appropriate screenings and long-term follow-ups with patients; 
(5) keep current with medical developments by reading broadly 
and critically; and (6) don’t have tunnel vision. In the instance of 
mental health treatment, off-label use can be particularly 
troubling, especially where the psychiatrist (or general 
practitioner) legally and frequently prescribes antipsychotics to 
the nonpsychotic patient. 
In general, the psychiatric patient group experiences a 
heightened potential for vulnerability due to the nature of mental 
health illnesses and the increased sense of confidentiality and 
trust inherent in the psychiatrist-patient relationship. While the 
mentally ill patient may need additional protections against 
unsafe and ineffective off-label use of prescription drugs, the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) takes a hands-off approach, 
generally abdicating any responsibility for ensuring the welfare of 
those who are prescribed approved drugs for unapproved 
purposes.   
This Article examines the “practice of medicine exception” 
applicable in U.S. drug law that allows licensed physicians, 
including psychiatrists, to write prescriptions for non-indicated 
purposes and non-studied patient populations, and the various 
bases and supports proffered for this system structure. Part I 
considers the purposes of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
 
6. Note that a recent Medscape poll found that of respondent-
physicians under age 34, 39% viewed the Oath as “very 
meaningful,” whereas with respondent-physicians over age 64, 70% 
said the Oath was “very meaningful.” Marcia Frellick, Youngest, 
Oldest Physicians Diverge on Hippocratic Oath, MEDSCAPE (June 
2, 2017), https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/880688#vp_1 
[https://perma.cc/5A5A-WENL]. 
Health Matrix·Volume 30·2020 
The Off-Label Loophole in the Psychopharmacologic Setting 
238 
Act of 1938 and the role of physicians in the U.S. prescription-
drug scheme. Part II provides an overview of antipsychotics. Part 
III considers the prevalence of psychiatrists prescribing 
antipsychotics to nonpsychotic patients, addresses the absence of 
safety and efficacy studies, and proposes that psychiatrists are 
legally conducting quasi “clinical drug trials” in the collective 
treatment of individual patients. Part IV contemplates who, if 
anyone or any entity, is willing to protect our vulnerable 
psychiatric patients (especially multiply vulnerable psychiatric 
patients), and explores how certain patient groups are “legally 
safe” specimens for informal “clinical drug trials.” It also reviews 
unsuccessful past attempts by FDA and Congress to close the off-
label loophole, proposes putting the public health before the 
health care professional, and considers what might be done to 
bring about change and reform. The Article concludes with 
thoughts on future efforts that might protect nonpsychotic 
psychiatric patients from potentially harmful antipsychotics not 
proved to be safe or effective in this population. 
I. Purposes of FDCA and Role of Physicians 
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA)7 
regulates drug quality, providing that “no new drug can be 
marketed until proved safe for use under the conditions described 
on the label and approved by the FDA.”8 The Kefauver-Harris 
Amendment of 1962, also referred to as the Drug Efficacy 
Amendment, added the requirement that a drug not only must 
be safe, but it must be effective. The 1962 amendment also 
augmented subject protections in clinical drug investigations by 
requiring subjects’ informed consent and the reporting of adverse 
reactions related to study drugs.9 Several amendments have been 
enacted since, but none that alter these essential protections. 
A. Requirements for New Drugs: Safety and Efficacy 
For the purpose of protecting “the nation from harmful or 
worthless drugs and devices,” FDA has been charged by Congress 
to ensure that only drugs, devices and biologics that have been 
 
7. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (2018). 
8. RICHARD R. ABOOD & DAVID B. BRUSHWOOD, PHARMACY PRACTICE 
AND THE LAW 27 (1994). 
9. Id. at 28. 
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reviewed and approved by FDA for both safety and efficacy may 
be sold in the United States.10 Sponsors file applications for an 
Investigational New Drug (IND) with FDA, and the agency 
ultimately decides the types of clinical trials that are necessary to 
prove that the new treatment is safe and effective for treating a 
particular medical ailment in a particular patient population.11 
FDA’s rules protecting human subjects in clinical trials can be 
found in two locations: (1) 21 C.F.R. Part 56, relating to 
Institutional Review Boards (IRBs); and (2) 21 C.F.R. Part 50, 
relating to informed consent.12 Under FDA regulations, IRBs 
assist the agency with human-subjects protection by reviewing 
and monitoring clinical trials within FDA’s jurisdiction.13 
Once completed, results from an FDA-approved study must 
be submitted to an expert panel, which then tells FDA whether 
or not the drug has been demonstrated to be safe and effective.14 
FDA’s “stamp of approval” extends only to the specified medical 
purpose and the specified population for which the drug, device, 
or biologic was studied. After approval, in numerous instances, 
medical experts have discovered that treatments approved for one 
indication “may also serve other valuable medical purposes.”15 
FDA views its mandate as ensuring the safety and efficacy of 
drugs and devices under conditions set forth by the manufacturer 
 
10. Coleen Klasmeier & Martin H. Redish, Off-Label Prescription 
Advertising, The FDA and the First Amendment: A Study in the 
Values of Commercial Speech Protection, 37 AM. J. L. & MED. 315 
(2011) (referencing 21 U.S.C. §§ 335(a), 360(k), 360(e) (2018)); see 
CARL H. COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF 
RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 151 (2nd ed. 2015). 
11. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 251. 
12. Id. 
13. Richard M. Cooper & Benjamin M. Greenblum, The Philosophy of 
Food and Drug Law, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FDA’S FOOD AND 
DRUG LAW AND REGULATION 67, 79 (Kenneth R. Piňa & Wayne L. 
Pines eds. 2017). 
14. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 151. 
15. Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 10, at 315 n. 2 (citing John E. 
Osborn, Can I Tell You the Truth? A Comparative Perspective on 
Regulating Off-Label Scientific and Medical Information, 10 YALE 
L. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 299, 304 (2010) (“[I]n some 
therapeutic areas off-label uses are the customary, preferred 
treatments and are publicly declared to be such on patient 
advocacy group websites and elsewhere.”)). 
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in the IND study, not whether a medical treatment is safe for any 
use for which it may actually be prescribed.16 But this “any use” 
permission allows for the possibility that using an approved drug 
in an unapproved manner may result in “worthless or even 
dangerous” medication of a patient.17 Logic would instruct that if 
FDA is charged with protecting the public from harmful and 
useless drugs, medical devices, and biologics, then the agency 
should require testing and approval for any use that is outside 
the scope of the IND study.18 While the approval process for 
drugs, devices, and biologics determines the safety for human use 
under particular parameters, uses for completely different 
purposes and populations could give rise to public safety issues.19 
B.  Off-Label Prescription 
Off-label use generally refers to three things: (1) the practice 
of a physician prescribing a legally manufactured drug for 
purposes other than those indicated on that drug’s FDA-
mandated labeling;20 (2) using a different method of applying the 
treatment and prescribing a drug, device, or biologic to patient 
groups other than those approved by FDA;21 and (3) prescriptions 
for drug dosages that are different from the approved label-
recommended dosage or for time periods exceeding the label-
recommended usage.22 
 
16. Carol Berry, The Dividing Line Between the Role of the FDA and 
the Practice of Medicine: A Historical Review and Current 
Analysis, at 33–34 (1997), available at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-
3:HUL.InstRepos:8846812 [https://perma.cc/E98C-QCUE] 
(unpublished Third Year paper). 
17. Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 10, at 316. 
18. Berry, supra note 16, at 35. 
19. Id. at 38–39. 
20. Ramune E. Barkus & Armand Derian, Physician and Hospital 
Liability in Drug and Medical-Device Litigation, in DRUG INJURY: 
LIABILITY, ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION 861, 863 (James T. 
O’Donnell ed., 3d ed. 2012). 
21. Richard C. Ausness, There’s Danger Here, Cherie!: Liability For 
The Promotion and Marketing of Drugs and Medical Devices for 
Off-Label Uses, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1253, 1254 (2008) (citing Lars 
Noah, Constraints on the Off-Label Uses of Prescription Drug 
Products, 16 J. PROD. & TOXICS LIAB. 139, 141 (1994)). 
22. Id. (citing Elizabeth A. Weeks, Is It Worth the Trouble? The New 
Policy on Dissemination of Information On Off-Label Use Under 
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The accepted practice of off-label prescribing for non-
indicated purposes or populations both undermines FDA’s 
authority and mission, as well as deters pharmaceutical 
manufacturers from seeking on-label FDA approval for purposes 
the manufacturer could foresee as a widespread alternative use.23 
Proponents of off-label uses argue that what is “safe” and 
“effective” should depend partly on a physician’s judgment and 
preferences, and not exclusively on objective fact.24 These 
proponents state—as though inherently a positive proposition—
that “[o]ff-label prescribing offers patients and doctors a choice 
between the judgements of the medical and scientific 
communities” and those of FDA.25 But FDA’s purpose is to 
protect the American public from unsafe and ineffective drugs, 
and the agency requires a certain level of proof before initial 
approval of a drug. In turn, the off-label option may cast the 
initial FDA approval as a mere “wedge to permit the industry’s 
equivalent of the Wild West, where the rule of law was seen only 
rarely.”26 
The American public largely is unaware of the prevalence of 
off-label prescribing.27 Despite the ubiquitous nature of off-label 
uses, a 2016 Consumer Reports survey revealed that ninety-four 
percent of Americans could not recall ever having been informed 
by a doctor that their prescriptions were for a purpose not 
approved by FDA and sixty-three percent said that they would 
refuse a doctor-prescribed drug that was not FDA-approved for 
their particular ailment.28 So, while most patients would want to 
 
the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, 54 
FOOD & DRUG L. J. 645, 647 (1999)). 
23. Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 10, at 316. 
24. Alexander T. Tabarrok, Assessing the FDA Via the Anomaly of 
Off-Label Drug Prescribing, 5 THE INDEP. REV. 25, 34 (2000). 
25. Id. 
26. Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 10, at 316. 
27. Margaret Z. Johns, Informed Consent: Requiring Doctors to 
Disclose Off-Label Prescriptions and Conflicts of Interest, 58 
HASTINGS L. J. 967, 979 (2007). 
28. Christopher Robertson, National Survey Suggests that Off-Label 
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know that their prescriptions are not for FDA-approved uses, this 
information is often withheld.29 In contrast to FDA’s requirement 
of informed, written consent for all phases of IND clinical trials, 
“there is no FDA requirement of informed consent to off-label 
prescriptions which [ ] FDA does not regulate at all.”30 
There are many reasons why a physician might prescribe a 
drug off label. For example, there may be no FDA-approved drug 
to treat a particular ailment.31 With regard to pediatric patients, 
only twenty-to-thirty percent of FDA-approved drugs are labeled 
for pediatric use:32 Without the off-label option, many pediatric 
diseases would go untreated.33 In remarks on the Food and Drug 
Administration Modernization and Accountability Act of 1997, 
one Senator stated: “[a]s much as 90 percent of all of the uses of 
drugs in oncology or the treatment of cancer are used in what is 
called an off-label or extra-label manner.”34 
However, skepticism about the appropriateness of off-label 
uses finds support in a 2006 Archives of Internal Medicine survey 
that reviewed 150 million off-label prescriptions in the United 
States, finding that “73 percent had little to no scientific 
backing.”35 That study found that “off-label medication use is 
common in outpatient care, and most occurs without scientific 
support.”36 Without safety and efficacy studies, off-label uses of 
prescription drugs “can be risky, and some off-label uses have 
 
29. Id. 
30. Johns, supra note 27, at 979. 
31. Marisa A. Trasatti & Lindsey N. Lanzendorfer, Defending Products 
Liability Suits Involving Off-Label Use: Does the Learned 
Intermediary Doctrine Apply?, 62 FED’N DEF. CORP. COUNS. Q. 2, 
5 (2011), available at https://cdn.ymaws.com/thefederation.site- 
ym.com/resource/resmgr/docs/Quarterly/Archive/V62N1_Cover- 
to-Cover.pdf [https://perma.cc/GM3Z-B5QC]. 
32. Id. at 5. 
33. Id. 
34. 143 CONG. REC. S8165 (daily ed. July 28, 1997) (statement of Sen. 
Frist). 
35. Mithani, supra note 1, at 577 (citing David C. Radley et al., Off-
Label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166(9) ARCH. 
INTERN. MED. 1021 (2006)); see also Johns, supra note 27, at 969; 
Wendy Teo, FDA and the Practice of Medicine: Looking at Off-
Label Drugs, 41 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 305, 311 (2017). 
36. Johns, supra note 27, at 969. 
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turned out to be very dangerous.”37 For example, in the case of 
the drug Fenfluramine, from the mid-to-late-1990s doctors wrote 
eighteen million prescriptions for its off-label use for weight loss 
before it was discovered that the drug had caused almost three 
hundred thousand people to suffer heart-valve damage.38 Patients 
actually may be exposed to more risk after a drug, device, or 
biologic is FDA-approved, as opposed to still under investigation, 
because during clinical trials on human subjects, FDA imposes 
strict informed consent requirements.39 
While the Federal Government could attempt to circumvent 
this potential danger by imposing a blanket prohibition against 
all off-label uses, and instead mandate that drugs, devices, and 
biologics be granted FDA approval for each and every use by each 
and every population, this alternative has its own host of 
problems.40 Such a ban could result in potentially beneficial uses 
for some of our most serious diseases being tied up for years in 
the FDA-approval process. Another possibility would be that 
pharmaceuticals and device manufacturers would simply walk 
away, deciding that the costs outweigh any benefits that 
manufacturers could realize through obtaining new and separate 
approvals for each type of off-label use.41 Terminally ill patients, 
for example, might be left with no treatment options at all. 
There are arguments for both sides. Distinctions can be made, 
however, when talking about incurable, life-threatening illnesses, 
versus the use of mind-altering antipsychotics in the nonpsychotic 
patient population. Even if the psychiatric patient is severely 
depressed and suicidal, for example, alternative measures could 
be taken—even in emergency situations—to prevent death and 
stabilize the patient without introducing antipsychotics into the 
 
37. Kaspar J. Stoffelmayr, Comment, Products Liability and “Off-
Label” Uses of Prescription Drugs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 280 
(1996) (footnote omitted). 
38. Mithani, supra note 1, at 577 (citing Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label 
Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-Approved Drugs: An 
Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REV. 
181, 203 (1999) and Molly Sachdev et al., Effect of Fenfluramine-
Derivative Diet Pills on Cardiac Valves: A Meta-Analysis of 
Observational Studies, 144 AM. HEART J. 1071 (2002)). 
39. Berry, supra note 16, at 45 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(3) (2018)). 
40. Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 10, at 316. 
41. Id. 
Health Matrix·Volume 30·2020 
The Off-Label Loophole in the Psychopharmacologic Setting 
244 
already frail or troubled mind. Such alternatives include longer 
inpatient stays and more psychosocial interventions. In extreme 
situations of treatment-resistant depression, electroconvulsive 
therapy under anesthesia may be another effective intervention.42 
These suggested alternatives, however, require more time and 
expense compared to patients swallowing pills widely available as 
cheap generics. If time and cost constraints prohibit alternative 
treatments, another possibility is to continue allowing use of 
antipsychotics in the nonpsychotic patient population under 
emergency circumstances, but imposing limits on the duration of 
such treatment. Especially in the circumstance of the 
nonpsychotic patient taking antipsychotic drugs on a long-term 
basis, side effects can be deleterious, even deadly. 
C.  The “Practice of Medicine Exception” 
1. FDA Deference to Physicians 
Policy justifications for off-label prescribing rest on the fact 
that FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine. Again, once 
a drug is approved by FDA, use of that drug is not restricted to 
uses indicated on FDA-mandated labeling.43 FDA has always 
maintained that it will not interfere with a physician’s 
autonomy,44 and that the Practice of Medicine Exception prevents 
the agency from regulating a physician’s “unapproved use of an 
approved drug” within the confines of clinical practice.45 In 1998, 
FDA issued guidance specifically addressing off-label use of drugs. 
In that paper, FDA stated that the patient’s bests interests and 
good medical practice require that physicians have freedom to 
decide which prescription drugs, biologics, and devices to use, and 
such determination should be based on the physician’s “best 
 
42. Kristina Thurin et al., How Neuroscience is Informing Treatments: 
Ethical Issues, 17 FOCUS 35, 37 (2019) (“[T]he notion of ECT 
causing brain damage is a myth, with no scientific evidence to 
support it” and “[r]ecent studies show . . . that ECT is associated 
with increases in brain volume in regions such as the hippocampus 
and with increased integrity of connections between brain 
region[s].”). 
43. Barkus & Derian, supra note 20, at 863. 
44. Teo, supra note 35, at 305. 
45. Berry, supra note 16, at 35–36; C Lee Ventola, Off-Label Drug 
Information: Regulation, Distribution, Evaluation, and Related 
Controversies, 34 PHARM. & THERAPEUTICS 436 (2009). 
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knowledge and judgment.”46 FDA continued that when 
prescribing for a use not indicated on approved labeling, a 
physician must be well informed, base the off-label prescription 
on a firm scientific rationale and medical evidence, and then 
maintain records documenting the off-label use and its effects on 
the patient.47 Further, an IND or Investigational Device 
Exemption (IDE) are not required if the off-label use is pursuant 
to the “practice of medicine.”48 In 1999, FDA formally amended 
its regulations, clarifying decidedly, as follows: “(d) Unlabeled 
indication. This part does not apply to the use in the practice of 
medicine for the unlabeled indication of a new drug product 
approved under part 314 or of a licensed biological product.”49 
This was one more signal that FDA was comfortable with the 
status quo, and would not be interjecting itself into the physician-
patient relationship. 
The federal government’s position is clear: FDA regulations 
“do not restrict a physician’s ability to prescribe drugs for off 
label uses,”50 and federal courts reiterate this stance, without 
question.51 For example, in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal 
Comm.,52 the U.S. Supreme Court noted that once a drug receives 
FDA approval for any use, physicians may use legally marketed 
drugs in any way they believe will best serve their patients, and 
described off-label prescribing as “an accepted and necessary 
corollary” of FDA’s “mission to regulate in this area without 
 
46. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 167. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 10, at 323 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 
312.2(d) (2019)). 
50. Trasatti & Lanzendorfer, supra note 31, at n. 9 (citing Ausness, 
supra note 21, at n. 7). 
51. See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 121 S.Ct. 1012, 
1018 (2001); United States ex rel. Polansky v. Pfizer, Inc., 822 F.3d 
613, 615 (2nd Cir. 2016) (quoting U.S. v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 
153 (2nd Cir. 2012) for the statement that “[o]nce FDA-approved, 
prescription drugs can be prescribed by doctors for both FDA-
approved and unapproved uses; the FDA generally does not 
regulate how physicians use approved drugs.”). 
52. Buckman, 121 S.Ct. at 1018–19 (2001). 
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directly interfering with the practice of medicine.”53 In United 
States v. Evers,54 the Fifth Circuit stated that though FDA “‘was 
obviously intended to control the availability of drugs for 
prescribing by physicians,’ it ‘was not intended to regulate the 
practice of medicine.’”55 And in discussing the topic in United 
States v. Regenerative Sciences,56 the D.C. District Court noted 
that FDA did not disagree with the proposition that “Congress 
has left the practice of medicine to the States to regulate.”57 
Aside from the federal-state debate, long included in 
arguments that practitioners should control medical practice is 
the assertion that when government at any level—federal, state 
or local—limits practitioner discretion, this negatively effects the 
quality of medical care.58 Off-label drug prescription and use is 
considered by some “an important part of mainstream, legitimate 
medical practice.”59 Leaders in medicine assert, rightly so, that it 
would constitute medical malpractice if, in some instances, a 
physician failed to use a drug in an off-label manner.60 
It seems rather illogical that FDA’s responsibility to 
safeguard the public from unsafe use of drugs has no overlap with 
the physician’s right to prescribe an approved medication off label 
within the practice of medicine.61 Yet, the only substantial limits 
on a physician’s practice of medicine are those imposed by state 
 
53. Trasatti & Lanzendorfer, supra note 31, at n.11 (citing Buckman, 
121 S.Ct. at 1018). 
54. United States v. Evers, 643 F.2d 1043, 1048 (5th Cir. 1981). 
55. Patricia J. Zettler, Toward Coherent Federal Oversight of 
Medicine, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 427, 430 (2015) (citing Evers, 643 
F.2d at 1048); see also Teo, supra note 35, at 324. 
56. U.S. v. Regenerative Sciences, LLC, 878 F. Supp. 2d 248, 255 (D. 
D.C. 2012), aff’d, 741 F.3d 1314–15 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
57. Zettler, supra note 55, at 430 (citing Regenerative Sciences, 878 F. 
Supp. 2d at 255). 
58. Id. at 437 (citing, cf., JONATHAN OBERLANDER, THE POLITICAL LIFE 
OF MEDICARE 22 (2003) for the statement that “the American 
Medical Association lobbied against government health insurance 
in 1949 by arguing that it would ‘inevitably erode the quality of 
medical care by giving the government [rather than physicians] 
control over medical services.’”). 
59. Stoffelmayr, supra note 37, at 276. 
60. Id. 
61. Teo, supra note 35, at 306. 
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law regarding medical licensure and malpractice and those set by 
third-party payors for reimbursement standards.62 But how, 
exactly, is “the practice of medicine” defined? One scholar poses 
and responds to the question aptly: “Is the ‘practice of medicine’ 
whatever . . . physicians say it is, or is it a question of how to 
properly treat patients? . . . If it is the latter, then in the name 
of safeguarding the public health, perhaps there is some 
foundation for the government to intervene and impose 
regulations.”63 In The Belmont Report, the 1979 report of the 
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, the Commission drew 
distinctions between medical research and medical practice, the 
latter defined as “interventions that are designed solely to 
enhance the wellbeing of an individual . . . and that have a 
reasonable expectation of success.”64 Our modern definitions of 
“the practice of medicine” are derived from statutory language 
and court decisions, and among the states there are various 
interpretations65 that fluctuate over time.66 An unequivocal 
determination of the scope of “the practice of medicine exception” 
has never been established,67 and often depends on the 
stakeholders involved in setting the parameters.68 
 
62. Cooper & Greenblum, supra note 13, at 79. 
63. Teo, supra note 35, at 306. 
64. NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUM. SUBJECTS OF 
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAV. RES., THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL 
PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN 
SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH 2 (1978), available at https://www.
hhs.gov/ohrp/sites/default/files/the-belmont-report-508c_FINAL
.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7S7-USU4] [hereinafter THE BELMONT 
REPORT]; see also Nancy King, The Line Between Clinical 
Innovation and Human Experimentation, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 
573, 573 (2002) (footnote omitted). 
65. Zettler, supra note 55, at 435. 
66. Wendy Teo notes varying descriptions over time, from the “art of 
healing” to the administration of drugs or performance of surgery. 
“It is difficult to reach a uniform position on certain activities, and 
states and courts have also grappled with defining and delineating 
the boundaries of the practice of medicine.” Teo, supra note 35, at 
306. 
67. Berry, supra note 16, at 12. 
68. Zettler, supra note 55, at 435. 
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Given the differences in statutory definitions and language, 
state courts understandably reach divergent conclusions when 
viewing similar activities and determining, for example, whether 
or not medical malpractice has been proven.69 However, there are 
general similarities in state statutes and court determinations 
regarding what constitutes “the practice of medicine,” most 
including two physician activities: (1) the diagnosis of a disease, 
condition or injury, and (2) the prescribing, administration or 
provision of treatment for a disease, condition or injury.70 
Although there are nuances in how it is defined, the Practice of 
Medicine Exception appears to create a loophole that allows 
innovation and experimentation with little-to-no out-of-pocket 
cost to the drug manufacturer, and a huge risk reduction relating 
to the manufacturer’s potential liability. 
2. Legislative Intent Underpins “Practice of Medicine Exception” 
The FDCA does not explicitly support FDA’s stance on not 
regulating the practice of medicine; instead, “FDA’s deference to 
physicians is borne from Congressional intent.”71 Debates 
preceding enactment of the FDCA make clear that Congress 
never intended to regulate the practice of medicine.72 Considering 
that legislative history, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that 
“FDA’s mission [is to] . . . regulate . . . without directly 
interfering with the practice of medicine.”73 During congressional 
hearings in 1934, the medical profession expressed concern that 
the FDCA would interfere with the “prerogatives of the doctor.”74 
 
69. Id. at 435–36. 
70. Id. at 436; see also Teo, supra note 35, at 307 n.5 (citing Lars Noah, 
Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in Controlling the Practice 
of Medicine, 53 KAN. L. REV. 149, 162 (2004) and Cynthia Marietta 
& Amy L. McGuire, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: Is It the 
Practice of Medicine?, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS, 369, 371 (2009)). 
71. Teo, supra note 35, at 307. 
72. Id. at 308 (citing ROBERT P. BRADY, FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW & 
REGULATION: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT FOOD & DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION MODERNIZATION ACT 423–24 (David G. Adams & 
Richard M. Cooper eds., 1st ed. 1997)). 
73. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 121 S.Ct. 1012, 1018 
(2001); see also Teo, supra note 35, at 308 n. 7. 
74. Berry, supra note 16, at 4 (citing 78 CONG. REC. NO. at 2728 
(1934)). 
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Senator Royal Copeland, also a homeopathic physician and strong 
proponent of the legislation, stated that “this bill makes certain 
that the medical practitioner shall not be interfered with in his 
practice.”75 
Amendments to the statutory language prior to the FDCA’s 
passage likewise show Congress’s intent not to interfere with the 
practice of medicine: “Initially section 321(b) of the 1938 Act, 
defining the term ‘drug,’ contained language stating that it was 
not intended ‘for the regulation of the legalized practice of the 
healing art.’”76 In 1951, the Durham-Humphrey Amendment to 
the FDCA did not effect any changes in the practice of medicine 
exception.77 The amendment actually exempted prescription 
drugs from section 352(f)’s requirements, giving physicians 
primary responsibility of informing patients as to directions for 
use and warnings about misuse.78 In 1962, Congress reiterated 
that FDA was not to interfere with the practice of medicine.79 In 
Section 214 of the 1997 Food and Drug Administration 
 
75. Id. at n.15 (citing Hutt, Regulation of the Practice of Medicine 
under the Pure Food and Drug Laws, 33 Q. BULL. ASS’N OF FOOD 
& DRUG OFF. NO.1, at 15 (1969)). 
76. Id. at 4–5 n.18, (citing H. R. REP. NO. 2755, at 5 (1936)); See also 
Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1180 n.13 (1983), rev’d 470 U.S. 
821 (1985) (quoting S. REP. NO. 361, 74th Cong. (1st Sess. 1935); 
S. REP. NO. 646, 74th Cong. (1st Sess. 1935) and Pharmaceutical 
Mfrs Ass’n, 484 F. Supp. 1179, 1184 (D. Del. 1980)). 
77. Id. at 7. 
78. Id. at n. 28 (citing Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass’n v. Food & Drug 
Admin, 484 F. Supp. 1179, 1185 (D. Del. 1980) (citing Hearings on 
H.R. 3298 Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, 82nd CONG. 1st Sess. 20–21 (1951) (remarks of Fed. 
Sec. Admin. Oscar Ewing)). 
79. Teo, supra note 35, at 308 n. 8 (citing Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 
780 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); Lars Noah, 
Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in Controlling the Practice 
of Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 173 n. 99 (2004) 
(“[T]he . . . [Act] should not interfere with the professional function 
of the physician. FDA clearance would assure physicians that a 
drug effectively produces certain physiological actions, but the 
physician, not the FDA, would determine whether these specific 
physiological effects would be useful or beneficial with respect to 
particular patients”). 
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Modernization Act,80 Congress directed that “nothing in [the 
FDCA] shall be construed to limit or interfere with the authority 
of a healthcare practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally 
marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease within 
a legitimate health care practitioner-patient relationship.”81 The 
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 200782 states 
that “nothing in this section shall be construed to . . . limit the 
practice of medicine.”83 Clearly, deference to physicians is a 
longstanding theme throughout the various iterations of U.S. 
Food and Drug law. 
Other U.S. health care laws likewise confer wide latitude to 
the medical profession in controlling the practice of medicine, for 
example, laws relating to Medicare, fertility, and drug addiction 
treatment.84 Even after a public health emergency, when drafting 
 
80. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. 
No. 105-115, § 214, 111 Stat. 2296 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 396). 
81. Teo, supra note 35, at 308 n. 9 (citing Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 214, 
111 Stat. 2296, 2348); see also Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal 
Comm., 121 S.Ct. 1012, 1018 (2001) (“Indeed, a recent amendment 
to the FDCA expressly states in part that ‘[n]othing in this chapter 
shall be construed to limit or interfere with the authority of a health 
care practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally marketed 
device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate 
health care practitioner-patient relationship’.”). 
82. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. 
No. 110-85, § 1111(d), 121 Stat. 823 (2007) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 247d-5a(d)). 
83. Teo, supra note 35, at 308 n.10 (citing Food and Drug 
Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 
§ 1111(d), 121 Stat. 823, 976 (2007).) 
84. Id. at n.11 (citing Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub. L. No. 
89-97, § 102(a), 79 Stat. 290, 291 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395) (“Nothing in [the Medicare statute] shall be construed to 
authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any 
supervision or control over the practice of medicine.”)); Fertility 
Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
493 § 3(i)(1), 106 Stat. 3146, 3149 (1992) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 263a-2(i)(1)) (“In developing the [federal embryo laboratory] 
certification program, the [Department of Health and Human 
Services] may not establish any regulation, standard, or 
requirement which has the effect of exercising supervision or control 
over the practice of medicine in assisted reproductive technology 
programs.”); To Amend the Public Health Service Act with 
Respect to Children’s Health, Pub. L. No. 106-310, § 3502, 114 
Stat. 1222, 1226 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 823(g)(2)(H)(i)) (“Nothing 
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the Drug Quality and Security Act of 2013,85 Congress expressed 
concern about encroaching on state regulation of medical 
practice.86 This was a measure aimed at remedying FDA’s limited 
authority to regulate compounding pharmacies following the fatal 
debacle involving a fungal meningitis outbreak traced to 
compounded lots of injectable glucocorticoid methylprednisolone 
acetate, produced by the Massachusetts-based New England 
Compounding Center.87 A proponent of the 2013 law, Senator 
Tom Coburn, emphasized that the Practice of Medicine remained 
in the ambit of state regulators, assuring that “‘the art and 
science of medicine would not be impeded’” by FDA.88 
D.  Physicians Regulated by State Law 
States regulate medical practice under their police powers, 
while the federal government regulates medical products.89 FDA 
has been clear that it does not and will not regulate the practice 
 
in such regulations or practice guidelines may authorize any 
Federal official or employee to exercise supervision or control over 
the practice of medicine or the manner in which medical services 
are provided.”)). 
85. Zettler, supra note 55, at 430 (citing Title I of the Drug Quality 
and Security Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-54, 127 Stat. 587 (2013), 
which addresses drug compounding; Title II of the act is intended 
to improve the security of the drug supply chain). 
86. Note that state regulation is actually carried out by state medical-
licensing boards, which are themselves controlled by physicians. So, 
in this context, state regulation equals self-regulation. See CARL 
ELLIOTT, WHITE COAT, BLACK HAT: ADVENTURES ON THE DARK 
SIDE OF MEDICINE at xi (2010). 
87. Kevin Outterson, Regulating Compounding Pharmacies after 
NECC, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1969, 1969 (2012). 
88. Zettler, supra note 55, at 430–31, 443 (citing 159 CONG. REC. 
S8029- 06 (Nov. 14, 2013) (statement of Sen. Coburn)) (“[t]he 
Social Security Amendments of 1954, for example, provided that 
‘[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the 
Commissioner of Social Security or any other officer or employee of 
the United States to interfere in any way with the practice of 
medicine’; The Medicare statute, the Fertility Success Rate and 
Certification Act of 1992; the Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act of 1997; the Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 
2000; and the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 
2007 each included a provision with similar language.”). 
89. Id. at 430 (citing Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122–23, 128 
(1889)). 
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of medicine, and that the FDCA is not a source of physician 
liability for harms arising from a physician’s off-label 
prescriptions.90 However, physicians are not exempt from liability 
arising from prescribing drugs off label.91 Theoretically, remedies 
are available at the state level. 
Medical malpractice insurance is costly, and medical 
literature cautions physicians that prescribing medications for off-
label use has resulted in greater malpractice risk.92 In order to 
preemptively reduce liability risks, the prudent physician would 
(1) remain abreast of news and developments relating to 
medications and their uses, (2) keep literature files relating to off-
label uses, (3) inform and emphasize to the patient that the 
proposed treatment involves an off-label use, and (4) continually 
document the patient’s informed consent.93 Yet, in the context of 
mental health medical malpractice, the tort system is far from 
perfect due to power differentials between mentally ill patients 
and their psychiatrists.94 Thus, the tort system cannot adequately 
regulate this space. 
However, in instances where physicians fail to meet their 
obligations by inappropriately prescribing a medication, the 
patient’s malpractice claims could sound in negligence (or in 
unusual circumstances strict liability) where warnings in the 
Physician Desk Reference or in the drug’s package insert were 
 
90. Katherine A. Helm, Protecting Public Health from Outside the 
Physician’s Office: A Century of FDA Regulation from Drug Safety 
Labeling to Off-Label Drug Promotion, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., 
MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 116, 167 (2007). 
91. Id. 
92. James O’Reilly & Amy Dalal, Off-Label or Out of Bounds? 
Prescriber and Marketer Liability for Unapproved Uses of FDA-
Approved Drugs, 12 ANN. HEALTH L. 295, 319 (2003) (footnote 
omitted). 
93. Id. 
94. Hannah Martens & Timothy Brown, Trusting Oneself and Others: 
Relational Vulnerability and DBS for Depression, 9 AM. J. 
BIOETHICS NEUROSCIENCE 226 (2018) (“[T]he patient’s active 
depressive symptoms, lesser knowledge about the [treatment], and 
lesser understanding of possible treatment alternatives produce a 
problematic power differential between the patient and their 
doctor.”). 
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disregarded.95 Liability might also arise where a physician failed 
to obtain patient informed consent.96 Laws vary from state to 
state, and what is negligent practice in one jurisdiction may be 
acceptable practice in another. A further complication, concepts 
of informed consent vary based on jurisdiction,97 and, in some 
states, courts have found that nothing obliges a physician to 
disclose the off-label use at all.98 
1. Strict Liability and Negligence 
While FDA has at least once asserted that it retains 
jurisdiction to regulate off-label prescription use,99 it has most 
often taken the position that state tort liability is the best means 
of controlling off-label uses.100 The idea is that in prescribing 
 
95. O’Reilly & Dalal, supra note 92, at 317 (footnote omitted); See 
Amy E. Todd, No Need for More Regulation: Payors and Their 
Role in Balancing the Cost and Safety Considerations of Off-Label 
Prescriptions, 37 AM. J. L. & MED. 422, 424 (2011) (citing James 
B. Riley, Jr. & P. Aaron Basilius, Physicians’ Liability for Off-
Label Prescriptions, 6 HEMATOLOGY & ONCOLOGY NEWS & ISSUES 
24, 26 (2007)); see also Barbara Marticelli McGarey, 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Consumer-Directed 
Information—Enhancing the Safety of Prescription Drug Use, 34 
CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 148 (1984). 
96. Amy E. Todd, No Need for More Regulation: Payors and Their 
Role in Balancing the Cost and Safety Considerations of Off-Label 
Prescriptions, 37 AM. J. L. & MED. 422, 424 (2011) (footnotes 
omitted). 
97. Mithani, supra note 1, at 579 (citing generally S. WEAR, INFORMED 
CONSENT: PATIENT AUTONOMY AND PHYSICIAN BENEFICENCE 
WITHIN CLINICAL MEDICINE (1993)). 
98. Todd, supra note 35, at 424 (citing Ausness, supra note 21, at 1253; 
Margaret Z. Johns, Informed Consent: Requiring Doctors to 
Disclose Off-Label Prescriptions and Conflicts of Interest, 58 
HASTINGS L. J. 967 (2007)); see also Klein v. Biscup, 673 N.E.2d 
225, 231 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. 1996). 
99. Stoffelmayr, supra note 37, at 279 n. 26; cf. Klasmeier & Redish, 
supra note 10, at 316 (“In any event, under the current regulatory 
framework, the FDA asserts that it lacks legal authority to restrict 
the ability of doctors to prescribe drugs or devices for off-label 
uses.” The latter is overwhelmingly the prevailing view.). 
100. Stoffelmayr, supra note 37, at 279 n. 25, (citing 48 Fed. Reg. 26,720, 
FDA, Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs; 
Prescribing for Uses Unapproved by the Food and Drug 
Administration, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503 (1972); and Use of Approved 
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antipsychotic or other drugs off label, psychiatrists may expose 
themselves to negligence liability by not fulfilling duties such as 
obtaining adequate medical and psychiatric histories, physical 
examinations, and laboratory tests.101 Further failures of 
obligations arise when a physician prescribes a drug where 
indication is lacking or a contraindication is present; prescribes 
an improper dosage or for an unwarranted duration; or fails to 
recognize, monitor or treat side effects, to abate reactions and 
interactions, or consult with other physicians.102 The patient also 
has a viable negligence claim against the psychiatrist-prescriber 
where the diagnosis itself was incorrect.103 But some 
commentators assert that the tort system cannot effectively 
regulate off-label drug uses, their criticisms focused on a plaintiff’s 
burdens in proving medical malpractice liability.104 
Both the physician and drug or device manufacturer have 
been defendants in lawsuits claiming injury from a prescribed 
drug or medical device. In the products-liability actions—
generally arising under theories of strict liability or negligence—
the plaintiff’s claims usually are based on the manufacturer’s 
failure to warn of potential risks and dangers.105 However, by 
prescribing a medication off-label, a physician unwittingly may 
be shielding the manufacturer from liability and exposing herself 
to state-level medical malpractice claims if the manufacturer in 
fact warned the physician of risks associated with the drug.106 
 
Drugs for Unlabeled Indications, 12 FDA DRUG BULL. 4, 5 (Apr. 
1982)). 
101. Jadwiga Najib, Drug-Induced Movement Disorders, in DRUG 
INJURY: LIABILITY, ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION, 419, 443 (James T. 
O’Donnell ed., 3d ed. 2012). 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Stoffelmayr, supra note 37, at 281 n. 37 (citing William L. 
Christopher, Off-Label Drug Prescription: Filling the Regulatory 
Vacuum, 48 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 247, 260–62 (1992) and Sydney A. 
Shapiro, Limiting Physician Freedom to Prescribe a Drug for Any 
Purpose: The Need for FDA Regulation, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 
869–72 (1978)). 
105. Trasatti & Lanzendorfer, supra note 31, at 8. 
106. Id. at 9; see discussion of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, infra, 
Part I.D.3. 
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Courts have adopted varying viewpoints regarding a drug 
manufacturer’s duties in the context of off-label uses of 
prescription drugs,107 and products liability cases in the off-label 
drug use arena are most notable for their inconsistency.108 The 
competing goals of incentivizing manufacturers to warn of risks 
and minimizing penalties for failure to do so109 seem more often 
to weigh in favor of protecting manufacturers. Criticisms of such 
an approach argue that the drug manufacturer should owe a duty 
to warn of any and all known risks associated with an off-label 
drug use, whether “demonstrated by the manufacturer’s own 
research, the research of others, or physicians’ experiences using 
the drug.”110 
2. Informed Consent 
Most patients fairly assume that the drugs their physician 
prescribes are FDA-approved,111 not understanding that once a 
drug is approved by FDA, it may be used for any purpose or 
population.112 Interestingly, despite the controversial nature of 
off-label prescription, little has been said or published addressing 
informed consent for off-label use.113 While FDA requires explicit 
written consent for drugs being tested in clinical trials, no such 
requirement attaches in the context of off-label prescriptions 
where, as in any other medical treatments, the doctor believes 
that he is using the drug in a manner that serves the patient’s 
best interests.114 The doctrine of informed consent imposes no 
 
107. Stoffelmayr, supra note 37, at 276 (footnote omitted). 
108. Id. at 275–76 n. 7. 
109. Id. at 276. 
110. Id. 
111. Mithani, supra note 1, at 577 (citing Wilkes & Johns, Informed 
Consent and Shared Decision-Making: A Requirement to Disclose 
to Patients Off-Label Prescriptions, 5 PLOS MED. e223 (2008)). 
112. Id. 
113. Id.; see also Berry, supra note 16, at 34 (“The general public is 
likely under the impression that if their doctor is prescribing a 
medical treatment, it has been tested and approved for that 
particular use.”). 
114. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics Comm. on Drugs, Uses of Drugs Not 
Described in the Package Insert (Off-Label Uses), 110 PEDIATRICS 
181, 182 (2002). 
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specific duty on the physician to inform the patient that the use 
of a drug, including an antipsychotic, is off label.115 
Failure to obtain informed consent is a failure to advise a 
patient of risks and potential risks associated with a proposed 
treatment, which all is material information required for a patient 
to make an informed decision about the treatment.116 In a legal 
proceeding, the patient-plaintiff often may assert that had he 
known of the risks, then he would not have consented to 
treatment with the offending drug.117 From a legal perspective, as 
the risk of a treatment rises, so too does the duty to warn, 
monitor, and consider alternative treatments.118 The physician 
would simultaneously best serve the patient’s and his own 
interests by focusing on safety and efficacy, and managing risk of 
malpractice liability by “following the traditional golden 
standards of medicine”: get informed consent, practice evidence-
based medicine, integrate specialized medicine, and provide 
comprehensive follow-up care.119 
Determining what qualifies as “significant or material” 
consent depends on the particular patient’s needs, capabilities, 
and wishes,120 as well as on the nature of the proposed treatment. 
Exceptions to informed consent requirements include patient 
incompetence,121 and among the common symptoms in psychiatric 
illness are impaired reasoning.122 However, where a psychiatrist is 
 
115. Helm, supra note 90, at 168; see Rebecca Dresser & Joel Frader, 
Off-Label Prescribing: A Call for Heightened Professional and 
Government Oversight, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 476, 480 (2009) 
(“The few courts that have considered the question have concluded 
that a product’s regulatory status is not part of the medical 
information that physicians must disclose about a proposed off-
label treatment (unless it is administered in the context of 
research).”). 
116. Barkus & Derian, supra note 20, at 863. 
117. Id. at 861. 
118. Najib, supra note 101, at 443 (footnote omitted); see also Barkus 
& Derian, supra note 20, at 862 (“[A] physician is required to 
disclose any significant or material risks associated with the 
treatment, as well as any available alternatives.”). 
119. Najib, supra note 101, at 443 (footnote omitted). 
120. Barkus & Derian, supra note 20, at 862. 
121. Id. 
122. Thurin et al., supra note 42, at 35. 
Health Matrix·Volume 30·2020 
The Off-Label Loophole in the Psychopharmacologic Setting 
257 
contemplating prescription of antipsychotics, off label or not, one 
would think that the patient (or the patient’s legal 
decisionmaker) must be informed of the risks of drug-induced 
movement disorders and other potential adverse effects, along 
with any potential benefits of use, before commencing 
antipsychotic treatment.123 Too frequently, however, this risk 
information is not shared with the patient or surrogate. Often 
times, psychiatric patients are persuaded by the “‘insulin for 
diabetes’ metaphor,” where the psychiatrist explains that there is 
a chemical basis to mental illness and the psychotropic drug will 
fix it, just as insulin does for the diabetic.124 The metaphor serves 
as “a summation of the risks and benefits,” and once this 
summary “is presented to a psychiatric patient, the patient can 
be understood to be misinformed about risks and benefits.”125 
3. “Learned Intermediary Doctrine” Protects Manufacturers 
The learned intermediary doctrine, first officially identified in 
a 1966 decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,126 
recognizes that if a treating physician received adequate notice of 
possible risks, the manufacturer has no duty to warn the end 
consumer.127 As such, the doctrine often affects the apportionment 
of liability between the physician and the pharmaceuticals 
manufacturer.128 Using the learned intermediary doctrine as an 
affirmative defense, the pharmaceuticals manufacturer can shift 
blame for any patient injuries to the prescribing doctor. This is 
because liability usually will not extend to the manufacturer 
where it could not have foreseen the off-label use or the physician 
failed to convey manufacturer-recommended warnings to the 
patient.129 
 
123. Najib, supra note 101, at 443. 
124. ROBERT WHITAKER & LISA COSGROVE, PSYCHIATRY UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE 157–58 (2015). 
125. Id. 
126. Sterling Drug Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966). 
127. Barkus & Derian, supra note 20, at 865 (citing Richard B. Goetz 
& Karen R. Growden, A Defense of the Learned Intermediary 
Doctrine, 63 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 421, 421 (2008)). 
128. Helm, supra note 90, at 168 (citing Marcus v. Specific Pharms. Inc., 
77 N.Y.S.2d 508, 509–10 (N.Y. App. Term. 1948)). 
129. Id. Note, however, that increases in DTC marketing are chipping 
away at protections for manufacturers, as there sometimes is no 
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Under the learned intermediary doctrine, pharmaceuticals 
manufacturers generally have no duty to warn patients of risks 
associated with a drug’s use, only a duty to warn prescribing 
physicians.130 Several recent U.S. Circuit Court cases confirm this 
line of thought. For example, in Payne v. Novartis 
Pharmaceuticals Corp.,131 in addressing the plaintiff’s claims 
against a manufacturer of bisphosphonates that allegedly caused 
osteonecrosis of the jaw, the court stated that “[a]t base, the 
doctrine can shift liability from drug companies to doctors: If the 
drug company adequately warned and instructed the doctor but 
the doctor did not adequately warn and instruct the patient, the 
patient’s quarrel is with the doctor rather than the drug 
company.”132 
Thus, a patient who suffers a drug injury due to lack of 
informed consent has a cause of action against the prescribing 
physician for medical malpractice instead of against the drug 
manufacturer for products liability.133 Were the manufacturer to 
warn the unsophisticated or uneducated patient of the potential 
risks, this warning would be insufficient because the patient, 
unlike the doctor, is not trained in appraising medical risks.134 
This is one reason why the manufacturer’s duty is only to warn 
prescribing physicians, who then assume responsibility for 
 
real intermediary. Id. at 169 (“DTC advertising tends to undercut 
the rationale behind the doctrine.”). Interestingly, Helm notes that 
“the duty for pharmaceutical manufacturers to warn the patient 
directly is supported by the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability § 6(c)–(d) (1998).” Id. 
130. Stoffelmayr, supra note 37, at 284–85 (footnote omitted). 
131. Payne v. Norvartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., 767 F.3d 526, 531 (6th 
Cir. 2014). 
132. See also Mink v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 860 F.3d 1319, 1329 (11th 
Cir. 2017) (holding, under the learned-intermediary doctrine, that 
Florida law barred the plaintiff-patient’s negligence claim against 
a hip joint replacement system manufacturer based on the theory 
that the manufacturer’s training of the physician was inadequate, 
and alleging that the manufacturer breached its duty to correctly 
train the plaintiff’s physician on how to implant the system; any 
duty the manufacturer had in regards to training was owed to the 
physician, not the patient). 
133. Barkus & Derian, supra note 20, at 865; see also ABOOD & 
BRUSHWOOD, supra note 8, at 230. 
134. ABOOD & BRUSHWOOD, supra note 8, at 230. 
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informing patients of risks of using the drug or device.135 Some 
argue that since the physician is in the better position to 
understand and weigh the risks and benefits in contemplating the 
specific patient’s needs and conditions, the learned intermediary 
doctrine is valid.136 Yet another rationale offered to support the 
doctrine is that doctors often have close and sometimes personal 
connections to patients and are more practically and effectively 
able to discuss risks and warnings than could a detached 
pharmaceuticals manufacturer.137 
Use of the learned intermediary doctrine as a defense has 
allowed pharmaceuticals manufacturers to limit or decrease 
products-liability claims regarding pharmaceuticals since the 1966 
Court of Appeals decision.138 Pharmaceuticals manufacturers 
continue to assert this defense, successfully insulating the 
companies from liability in negligence and strict liability actions, 
including design defect, misbranding, and breach of implied 
warranty claims.139 
 
135. Trasatti & Lanzendorfer, supra note 31, at 9 (“For the doctrine to 
apply, however, the physician must be aware of the risks associated 
with each drug or device. This awareness does not have to come 
from the manufacturer. Indeed, even if a manufacturer’s warning is 
inadequate, the doctrine will still apply if the physician has been 
sufficiently warned from other sources. In essence, the learned 
intermediary doctrine encompasses the physician’s entire field of 
knowledge.”). 
136. Id. at 9 (citing Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721 F. Supp. 89, 95 
(D. Md. 1989), aff’d, Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 898 F.2d 146 
(4th Cir. 1990)). 
137. Barkus & Derian, supra note 20, at 865. 
138. Though there are exceptions—for example, cases involving mass 
immunization, use of certain contraceptives, and instances where 
FDA has mandated that a manufacturer warn the consumer-
patient directly. Id. 
139. Trasatti & Lanzendorfer, supra note 31, at 8 (citing Fellows v. USV 
Pharm. Corp., 502 F. Supp. 297, 299–301 (D. Md. 1980); but see 
id. at 11–12 (“Personal injury claims increasingly allege injury from 
off-label use of medical products. These claims create a dilemma 
for pharmaceutical companies: the learned intermediary doctrine 
applies when physicians are aware of the risks associated with drug 
or device, but manufacturers are only required to warn physicians 
of risks associated with on-label uses and cannot know of all of the 
possible off-label uses of a medical product and the risks associated 
with those uses. In turn, this dilemma has resulted in substantial 
differences among state court decisions regarding a manufacturer’s 
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State laws and court decisions on application of the learned 
intermediary doctrine vary, with some considering “the totality 
of the circumstances, including the manufacturers’ knowledge, 
their promotion of the off-label use, and/or the foreseeability of 
the use”; some assuming that manufacturers always are duty-
bound to warn, thus refusing to apply the doctrine where 
warnings are absent; and others always applying the doctrine on 
the basis that a physician must use her knowledgebase and draw 
from her training in determining the best course of treatment for 
patients.140 This is troublesome because uniformity is lacking in 
state responses to harms arising from the same legal concept (that 
is directly tied to federal law on drug safety and efficacy, and 
permissible off-label prescription), leaving patients with similar 
claims in very different legal positions. As a group widely 
prescribed antipsychotics off label, nonpsychotic psychiatric 
patients—whether personally aware of it or not—are burdened by 
this legal uncertainty. 
In the context of psychiatric practice, much in individual 
treatment is uncontrolled and unregulated, and the courts do 
little-to-nothing to reel in the potential chaos. For example, in 
Boehm v. Eli Lilly & Co.,141 the Eastern District of Arkansas 
considered the case of a patient-plaintiff who developed tardive 
dyskinesia (TD)142 after three years taking the atypical 
antipsychotic, Zyprexa, for an approved but nonpsychotic 
diagnosis. The drug first was prescribed by a general practitioner, 
then later continued by a psychiatrist. The patient-plaintiff sued 
the pharmaceuticals manufacturer for failure to warn about the 
substantial risks of developing TD, but the district court 
dismissed the claim based on the Arkansas learned intermediary 
 
liability for failure to warn claims involving off-label use.”). The 
authors further note, however, that “West Virginia’s highest court, 
the Supreme Court of Appeals, is the only court to have rejected 
the learned intermediary doctrine.” Id. at 11 (citing Johnson & 
Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899, 913–14 (W. Va. 2007)); see 
also Barkus & Derian, supra note 20, at 861, 865. 
140. See Trasatti & Lanzendorfer, supra note 31, at 13–19. 
141. Boehm v. Eli Lily & Co., 747 F.3d 501, 502 (8th Cir. 2014) reh’g 
and reh’g en banc denied (Apr. 15, 2014). 
142. Tardive dyskinesia is an involuntary movement disorder long 
recognized as a side effect of antipsychotic drugs. See discussion of 
adverse side effects, infra, Part II.A.2. 
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doctrine.143 While the plaintiff argued that he had presented 
substantial evidence that Lilly’s warning to physicians as to the 
risk of developing TD after long-term use of Zyprexa was 
inadequate, the court disagreed, barring recovery against the 
manufacturer.144 Ultimately, the court’s reasoning was rational: 
Lilly’s package insert warned the prescribing doctors that 
though [TD] was an infrequent side effect, the risk that it 
would occur and become irreversible . . . was believed to 
increase as treatment continued over time and the patient’s 
total cumulative dose increased. . . . No studies or other 
evidence existed to guide prescribers about deploying the 
drug for more than one month. . . . Drs. Miller and 
Kaczenski knew all these risks from reading 
the Zyprexa package insert and from their experience with 
first and second generation anti-psychotic medicines. They 
prescribed Zyprexa for Timothy Boehm across many 
years because, weighing the risks against the benefits of 
treating his bipolar disorder, in their opinion the drug 
helped him. These two main prescribers thought Lilly’s 
warning adequate. Both are still prescribing Zyprexa to 
other patients.145 
The plaintiff could have pursued claims against the 
prescribing physicians, but with caps in many states on medical 
malpractice tort claim awards, his ability to recover non-economic 
damages would be quite limited. Among other reasons, if the 
physicians were following the standard of care for treating a 
bipolar patient, there would be little chance the plaintiff would 
prevail. 
In 2011, a member of Congress proposed legislation and 
admonished that Americans needed protection from drug 
manufacturers, and proposed outlawing use of the learned 
intermediary doctrine and allowing consumers to recover damages 
from pharmaceutical manufacturers directly.146 “Medications are 
 
143. Boehm v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 4:10-CV-159-DPM, 2012 WL 
12848432, at *5 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 4, 2012), aff’d, 747 F.3d 501 (8th 
Cir. 2014). 
144. Boehm, 747 F.3d at 507–08. 
145. Id. 
146. 157 CONG. REC. E199 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2011) (statement of Rep. 
Filner). 
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meant to heal us,” the congressman stated, “but sometimes, 
something goes horribly wrong, and the medicine that was 
supposed to make us better, only makes us sicker. When this 
happens, Americans should be able to hold the drug 
manufacturers responsible.”147 The proposed Bill went nowhere. 
Drug manufacturers are in the best position to issue warnings 
of risks associated with using their drugs.148 With the ability for 
broad monitoring—which is not feasible for the individual 
physician treating an individual patient—“drug manufacturers 
are, due to their superior ability to warn, the cheapest cost 
avoiders.”149 This does not place an undue or unfair burden on 
the manufacturer because, if found liable, the company generally 
can pursue contribution and indemnity claims against the 
physician whose negligence gave rise to the plaintiff’s injuries.150 
Still, there have been instances where courts have found that a 
physician’s negligence—especially if unforeseeable—may absolve 
a manufacture of “all liability for failure to warn of the risks 
associated with the use of its drug.”151 For example, in Ferrara v. 
Berlex Laboratories, Inc.,152 a products liability action against 
manufacturers of a prescription antidepressant (Nardil) and an 
over-the-counter decongestant (Deconamine), for failure to warn 
patients of the products’ dangerous synergistic side effects, the 
court held that under Pennsylvania law the learned intermediary 
doctrine precluded manufacturer liability. 
Several jurisdictions impose limits on recovering non-
economic losses against health care providers, but these statutory 
 
147. Id. 
148. Stoffelmayr, supra note 37, at 285. 
149. Stoffelmayr argues, “[i]mposing a duty on manufacturers to warn 
of the risks of off label drug uses does not, as might be feared, turn 
manufacturers into insurers for physicians who carelessly prescribe 
dangerous off-label treatments or who negligently misprescribe 
drugs and later characterize their mistakes as off-label treatments. 
Injured patients can still bring medical malpractice suits against 
negligent physicians.” Id. at 289. 
150. Id. (citing Charles F. Preuss, Measures of Liability, in PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY: DRUG CASES 303, 322–30 (Donald E. Vinson & 
Alexander H. Slaughter eds., 1988)). 
151. Id. at 289 (emphasis added). 
152. Ferrara v. Berlex Lab., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 552, 553 (E.D. Pa. 1990), 
aff’d, 914 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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limits do not apply to pharmaceuticals manufacturers; thus a 
physician’s liability for non-economic damages might be capped 
at $250,000, but the drug manufacturer’s liability for those 
damages could be exponentially higher.153 But not if that 
manufacturer is shielded from liability altogether.154 
The learned intermediary doctrine protects pharmaceuticals 
manufacturers from liability, shifting the “blame” or 
responsibility to the doctor. It may seem at first glance that 
physicians are assuming great professional and financial risks by 
prescribing medications off-label, because they will be “left 
holding the bag.” However, physicians have their own legally 
recognized means for self-protection, most significantly the 
accepted “standard of care.” 
4. “Standard of Care” Protects Physicians 
Courts generally consider off-label prescribing to be 
legitimate if it meets the standard of reasonable care.155 Thus, 
liability usually will not extend to the physician where the off-
label use is the accepted standard of care in the physician 
community.156 In any medical malpractice action, the patient-
plaintiff must establish that the physician failed to adhere to the 
accepted standard of care.157 In order for a medical malpractice 
claim to succeed on these grounds, the plaintiff must demonstrate 
the existence of a direct physician-patient relationship and that 
the physician significantly departed from the standard of care of 
a reasonable physician.158 While state laws vary in their exact 
determinations of accepted standards of care, generally the bar is 
 
153. Barkus & Derian, supra note 20, at 866 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 3333.2 (1872)). 
154. In subsequent cases, major precedential developments effectively 
have shielded generic pharmaceuticals manufacturers from all 
liability for failure to warn in labeling. See, e.g., Pliva, Inc. v. 
Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011); Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. 
Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472 (2013). These developments are beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
155. Helm, supra note 90, at 171; see also Klein v. Biscup, 673 N.E.2d 
225, 231 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. 1996). 
156. Helm, supra note 90, at 168. 
157. Mark Herrmann & Pearson Bownas, Keeping the Label Out of the 
Case, 103 NW. L. REV. COLLOQUY 477, 480 (2009). 
158. Helm, supra note 90, at 170. 
Health Matrix·Volume 30·2020 
The Off-Label Loophole in the Psychopharmacologic Setting 
264 
set quite low, looking at what would be expected of the minimally 
competent physician. 
In establishing the standard of care in medical malpractice 
actions against physicians for off-label use, peer-reviewed medical 
journals, introduced by expert testimony, “are generally 
considered the only reliable source of sound scientific and medical 
opinion.”159 Usually, this expert testimony is required to establish 
the medical community’s applicable standard of care and to allow 
a jury to ascertain whether the off-label use and warnings 
provided to the patient conformed to that standard.160 
Some scholars argue that FDA-approved labeling should not 
serve as evidence pertaining to the standard of care in litigation 
surrounding an off-label prescription gone wrong.161 Ironically, it 
is the very off-label use at issue that, if widespread, becomes the 
standard of care: the standard of care is the off-label use.162 If 
enough psychiatrists are prescribing antipsychotics to 
nonpsychotic patients, this becomes—and actually has become—
the standard of care.163 In treating individual patients, but in 
concert, psychiatrists have established this new standard of care, 
thereby insulating themselves from malpractice liability in courts 
of law.164 It follows that the more widespread a drug’s off-label 
use—whether based on science, anecdote or myth—the more 
impervious to liability is the prescribing physician. 
 
159. Id.; Cf. Mollie E. O’Brien, What Counts as Expert Medical 
Testimony?, 6 VIRTUAL MENTOR 554, 555 (2004). 
160. Barkus & Derian, supra note 20, at 863. 
161. Herrmann & Bownas, supra note 157, at 480. 
162. Id. at 486. 
163. See Alex R. Thiersch, Legal Issues: Off-Label Uses; Legal, Ethical 
and Informed Consent Considerations When Using Products Off-
Label, MEDESTHETICS MAG, https://www.medestheticsmag.com/
legal-issues-label-uses [https://perma.cc/W2XA-Y67A] (last 
visited Dec. 8, 2018) (recommending that providers not put 
themselves in a situation where a medical board views their 
prescribed treatment as too experimental). 
164. One might also consider the extension of this reasoning to informed 
consent. If failure to obtain informed consent has become the 
customary practice, is the physician’s failure to obtain the patient’s 
consent the new, accepted standard of care? 
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II. Antipsychotics: Pushing the Limits 
Antipsychotics serve a legitimate purpose in treating 
psychoses associated with mental illness after the particular drug 
has been scientifically shown to be safe and effective for that 
particular illness and study population. For the patient suffering 
from schizophrenia, antipsychotics can be lifechanging, for the 
better. For psychiatric patients not suffering from psychosis, 
antipsychotics can make their lives worse. 
A.  History 
Psychosis is marked by hallucinations, delusions, and severely 
disordered thought, often accompanied by extreme agitation and 
sleep disruption.165 Symptoms of hallucination include false 
perceptions (for example, hearing voices that are not there), and 
delusions, which are “false beliefs that do not yield to a rational 
argument.”166 With severe thought disorder there is a breakdown 
in logical connections between successive thoughts.167 Psychosis is 
not limited to the experience of patients suffering from 
schizophrenia, but also may be a state present in illnesses such as 
bi-polar disorder and severe major depressive disorder. 
Antipsychotics were developed in the early 1950s to treat 
psychoses.168 For patients experiencing psychotic “breaks with 
reality,” particularly those associated with schizophrenia,169 
antipsychotics provide “a crucial and potentially life-saving 
treatment.”170 Reducing dopamine activity within the brain is a 
 
165. Mary C. McCarron, The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs: 
Safeguarding the Mentally Incompetent Patient’s Right to 
Procedural Due Process, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 477, 481 n. 24 (1990). 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 477 (citing The Forcible Medication of Involuntarily 
Committed Mental Patients with Antipsychotic Drugs, 15 GA. L. 
REV. 739 (1981) (citing Davis, Antipsychotic Drugs, in FREEMAN 
H. KAPLAN & B. SADOCK, COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF 
PSYCHIATRY (2d ed. 1975)). 
169. Id. at 480–81. 
170. Brendan L. Smith, Inappropriate Prescribing: Research Shows 
That All Too Often, Americans Are Taking Medications That May 
Not Work or May Be Inappropriate for Their Mental Health 
Problems, 43 MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. 36 (June 2012). 
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common action of all antipsychotics.171 More specifically, a 
primary function of antipsychotics is accomplished through 
dopamine receptor-blocking agents—also known as neuroleptics 
and/or major tranquilizers—that block dopamine 
neurotransmission in the brain.172 Earlier antipsychotics were 
problematic because they were difficult to tolerate due to adverse 
side effects, particularly extrapyramidal side effects.173 In the 
1990s, pharmaceuticals manufacturers introduced a new wave of 
antipsychotics, interchangeably referred to as second generation 
antipsychotics (SGAs) and atypical antipsychotics.174 In addition 
to reducing dopamine activity, SGAs work to block serotonin 
receptors.175 
In the 1990s, major pharmaceuticals companies rolled out 
SGAs, such as Risperdal, Seroquel and Zyprexa, touting these 
new drugs as superior to first generation antipsychotics.176 SGAs 
supposedly were better tolerated by the patient suffering from 
schizophrenia, with fewer adverse side effects.177 But SGAs have 
not fully lived up to this promise, with virtually all SGAs having 
a propensity to cause certain degrees of adverse side effects.178 In 
fact, widespread use of SGAs followed at least one manufacturer’s 
now-documented suppression of unfavorable studies, and the 
manipulation and reporting of findings and results through 
academic psychiatrists with “apparent scientific legitimacy.”179 
Some experts now assert that while less cost effective than first-
generation antipsychotics, SGAs are “no more efficacious, do not 
 
171. DAVID HEALY, PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS EXPLAINED 28 (5th ed. 2009) 
[hereinafter HEALY—PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS]. 
172. Najib, supra note 101, at 420. 
173. Divac et al., supra note 5, at 1. 
174. Id. 
175. H. Meltzer & B. Massey, The Role of Serotonin Receptors in the 
Action of Atypical Antipsychotic Drugs, 11 CURRENT OPINION 
PHARMACOLOGY 59, 60 (2011). 
176. See WHITAKER & COSGROVE, supra note 124, at 77–85. 
177. Divac et al., supra note 5, at 2. 
178. Id. 
179. WHITAKER & COSGROVE, supra note 124, at 85. 
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improve specific symptoms, [and] have no clearly different side 
effect profiles” than their predecessors.180 
Antipsychotic drugs alleviate the major disruptive 
manifestations of psychosis, but their side effects are sometimes 
equally disruptive.181 While they are designed for patients 
suffering from psychoses, within the psychiatric profession, their 
prescription—even to the patient suffering from psychosis—is 
controversial due to the long-term risks associated with their 
use.182 Yet, SGA prescription in the U.S. almost tripled between 
1995 and 2008, expanding to over 16 million prescriptions for 
aripiprazole (Abilify), clozapine (Clozaril) and quetiapine 
(Seroquel).183 Disconcertingly, according to a study by Stanford 
University and the University of Chicago surveying over 1,700 
physicians, fifty-percent of those prescriptions in 2008 were for 
uses not supported by scientific evidence.184 If such a large number 
of antipsychotics prescriptions are written for indications and 
populations never studied, then what valid purposes are they 
serving? Closer examination of these off-label uses shows that 
 
180. Id. (quoting Peter Tyrer & Tim Kendall, The Spurious Advance of 
Antipsychotic Drug Therapy, 373 LANCET 4, 4–5 (2009) for the 
proposition that “[t]he spurious invention of the atypicals can now 
be regarded as invention only, cleverly manipulated by the drug 
industry for marketing purposes and only now being exposed. But 
how is it that for nearly two decades we have been beguiled into 
thinking they were superior?”). 
181. McCarron, supra note 165, at 483 n. 36 (footnotes omitted). One 
recipient of a psychotropic injection depicts his experience this way: 
 There is no other feeling like it. Nothing to relate it to, no 
experience anyone would normally go through in their life. It affects 
you mentally and physically and you feel suicidal. The physical 
effects are so bad you can’t stand it. . . . You get so tired (as if 
you’ve been up three days in a row) you lie down. But you can’t 
stay down for more than three or four minutes because your knees 
begin to ache, an itching type ache. . . . Your thoughts are broken, 
incoherent; you can’t hold a train of thought for even a minute. 
You’re talking about one subject and suddenly you’re talking about 
another. . . . Your mind is like a slot machine, every wheel spinning 
a different thought. 
 Opton, Psychiatric Violence Against Prisoners: When Therapy is 
Punishment, 45 MISS. L. J. 605, 641 (1974). 
182. McCarron, supra note 165, at 477 (footnote omitted). 
183. Smith, supra note . 
184. Id. 
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claims of legitimate clinical treatment purposes are often suspect, 
and sometimes clearly spurious. 
1. Sedation, Control, and Punishment, Not Treatment 
An antipsychotic’s immediate effect on patients is sedative.185 
By influencing chemical transmissions in the brain, antipsychotics 
sedate the patient suffering from schizophrenia “and suppress 
psychotic symptoms such as delusions, hallucinations, and other 
disorders.”186 Antipsychotic drugs do not cure the patient of 
mental illness, but may limit some of the more burdensome 
symptoms.187 Some authorities maintain that with proper drug 
maintenance and therapy, relapse can be prevented for a 
substantial number of patients who suffer from schizophrenia.188 
However, given the myriad severe side effects, many psychiatric 
patients suffering from psychosis justly wish to refuse 
antipsychotics and instead elect to suffer through psychotic 
episodes.189 
Extremely problematic are uses of antipsychotic drugs for 
non-treatment purposes, such as convenience of nursing home 
staff or to discipline or control nonpsychotic persons in custody 
or confinement.190 Extensive exposition on these questionable uses 
is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is noteworthy here that 
in many instances, clinical treatment of an individual’s mental 
illness is not the primary purpose of prescribing antipsychotics.191 
 
185. McCarron, supra note 165, at 482 n. 33 (citing R. Byck, Drugs and 
the Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders, in THE PHARMACOLOGICAL 
BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 158 (L. Goodman & A. Gilman eds., 
1975)). 
186. Id. at 481; See also Vicki Anderson, Right to Refuse Antipsychotic 
Medication: A Proposal for Legislative Consideration, 17 IND. L. 
REV. 1035, 1038–39 (1984). 
187. McCarron, supra note 165, at 481 (citing E. Symonds, Mental 
Patient’s Rights to Refuse Drugs: Involuntary Medication as Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 701, 704 
(1980)). 
188. Id. at 705 n. 22. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. at 484 (footnote omitted); see Part II.B, infra. 
191. See, e.g., US: Nursing Homes Misuse Drugs to Control Residents, 
HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 5, 2018, 3:01 AM), https://www.hrw
.org/news/2018/02/05/us-nursing-homes-misuse-drugs-control-
residents [https://perma.cc/BCV5-GAF9]. 
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In prison settings, the reason of “dangerousness to others” may 
permissibly be used to justify forced administration of 
antipsychotics, despite the availability of less intrusive or harmful 
measures.192 
2. Other Side Effects 
While antipsychotics have some positive effects for patients—
like the ability of a patient suffering from schizophrenia to 
function at home and even in the workforce—the increased 
freedom often comes with a high price.193 Some negative side 
effects will cease upon discontinuation of medication, but others 
are “serious, long-lasting and potentially more disruptive than the 
illness itself.”194 Studies have shown that when antipsychotics are 
used to treat patients suffering from schizophrenia, the presence 
of extrapyramidal side effects go undetected and, though 
recommended by the American Psychiatric Association (APA), 
documentation of significant adverse effects is not routine.195 
Extrapyramidal side effects include akathesia/Parkinsonian 
syndrome, dystonia and akinesia.196 Akathesia/Parkinsonian 
syndrome often is thought of as “the jitters,” and is a 
nonpermanent condition where the patient feels restless, cannot 
remain still and feels compelled to move and pace.197 Interestingly, 
research on akathesia shows that this very side effect, caused by 
the antipsychotic, frequently is misdiagnosed as a symptom of 
psychosis.198 Often, the result of this faulty inference is physician-
ordered dosage increases of the culpable antipsychotic 
 
192. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 217 (1990). 
193. McCarron, supra note 165, at 482. 
194. Id. at n. 29 (citing Steven Shobat, Pathway Through the 
Psychotropic Jungle: The Right to Refuse Psychotropic Drugs in 
Illinois, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 407, 411 (1985)). 
195. Najib, supra note 101, at 442–43. 
196. McCarron, supra note 165, at 482 (footnotes omitted). 
197. Id. at n. 30 (quoting E. MAGGIO, THE PSYCHIATRY-LAW DILEMMA 
225 (1981)). 
198. Id.; see also HEALY—PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS, supra note 171, at 31 
(stating akathisia is possibly the most serious side effect of 
antipsychotics). 
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medication.199 Dystonia involves muscular spasms, primarily in 
the head and neck, often combined with odd facial grimaces and 
tongue spasms.200 Akinesia has the effect of restricting a patient’s 
movements, even making the patient feel as though in a 
straitjacket.201 Just one dose has the power to make anyone 
appear to be suffering from schizophrenia,202 because if the 
akinesiac effect is severe, then it can result in a patient “sitting 
motionless in one place, almost like a zombie.”203 All three—
akathesia/Parkinsonian syndrome, dystonia and akinesia—can be 
minimized by lowering the dosage, discontinuation, or by use of 
anti-Parkinsonian drugs.204 
TD is the most devastating side effect, largely because 
oftentimes it is irreversible, even upon discontinuation of the 
antipsychotic.205 TD includes “involuntary, rhythmic movements 
of the face, mouth, tongue, and jaw.”206 While SGAs have a lower 
incidence of TD than first generation antipsychotics,207 the risk of 
developing TD with either type of antipsychotic is believed to 
increase as a patient’s lifetime dose increases.208 Serious side 
effects more often associated with SGAs include hormonal 
changes (i.e. an increase in the level of prolactin through D2 
receptor binding),209 in addition to metabolism changes, major 
 
199. McCarron, supra note 165, at 482 (citing Symonds, supra note 187, 
at 707–08). 
200. Id. at n. 31 (quoting Symonds, supra note 187, at 707 n. 37). 
201. HEALY—PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS, supra note 171, at 29. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. McCarron, supra note 165, at 482 (footnotes omitted). 
205. Id. at 482. 
206. Id. (footnote omitted). 
207. Maren Carbon et al., Tardive Dyskinesia Risk with First- and 
Second-Generation Antipsychotics in Comparative Randomized 
Controlled Trials: A Meta-Analysis, 17 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 330, 
336 (2018). 
208. Id. at 332. 
209. Id. An increased prolactin level can cause breasts to develop in boys 
and men (with lactation) and lactation to begin in non-nursing 
women. HEALY—PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS, supra note 171, at 34–5; see 
also Steven Brill, America’s Most Admired Lawbreaker, 
HUFFINGTON POST, http://highline.huffingtonpost.com/miracle
industry/americas-most-admired-lawbreaker/ [https://perma.cc/
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weight gain,210 and an increased risk of irreversible diabetes.211 
These metabolic changes are known as “metabolic syndrome.” 
Among other side effects are demotivation, sexual side effects, 
skin rashes, dry mouth and compulsive drinking, aggression and 
impatience, neuroleptic malignant syndrome, cardiovascular 
conditions, epilepsy, suicide and severe withdrawal effects.212 
Though absurd and unexpected in this age of evidence-based 
medicine, there are instances where “evidence” has been created 
in order to defend against and disprove adverse events appearing 
in clinical-trial data.213 For example, following concerns in the 
mid-1990s that Zyprexa, an antipsychotic, might cause diabetes, 
Eli Lilly dug through history to revive an association between 
psychosis and diabetes “documented” by Henry Maudsley in 
1879.214 The company then authored or sponsored articles that 
liberally used this anecdotal “evidence” as support for a causal 
connection between schizophrenia and diabetes—asserting that it 
was the schizophrenia “after all, and not Zyprexa, that was 
causing the problem.”215 There were no published objections either 
in the U.S. or Europe from members of the psychiatric 
profession.216 In a 2004 study examining 396 patients suffering 
 
D2EB-MFFB] (last visited Dec. 7, 2018) (documenting a class-
action lawsuit against Johnson & Johnson for adverse side effects 
from Risperdal). 
210. David Arterburn et al., Antipsychotic Medications and Extreme 
Weight Gain in Two Health Systems, 10 OBESITY RES. & CLINICAL 
PRAC. 408, 409 (2016). 
211. JULIE HOLLAND, MOODY BITCHES 315–16 (2015); See also Najib, 
supra note 101, at 434 n. 88. 
212. HEALY—PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS, supra note 171, at 33–41. As is the 
case with antidepressants, withdrawal effects from antipsychotics 
can be misinterpreted by both the psychiatrist and patient as 
evidence that the medication is needed, and can bolster the 
sometimes-inaccurate assumption that the treatment and not 
“placebo factors have brought about a clinical response.” Id. at 59. 
In such instances, where an antipsychotic is being used off-label 
because there have been no clinical studies to either support or 
refute assumptions regarding efficacy, “science” is no more than a 
guess. 




Health Matrix·Volume 30·2020 
The Off-Label Loophole in the Psychopharmacologic Setting 
272 
from psychosis, not a single one had type-2 diabetes.217 Once 
treated with antipsychotics, these patients developed diabetes at 
twice the normal rate.218 Yet, most physicians have been swayed 
by the anecdote repeatedly “reported” by pharmaceuticals 
manufacturers.219 
Psychiatric patients suffering from schizophrenia or other 
psychosis-inducing illnesses may feel that treatment with 
antipsychotics is quite beneficial. While this is not always the 
case, these individuals and their physicians may have assessed 
that the risks of adverse side effects are justified by the benefits 
of being able to live without psychosis. In instances where 
antipsychotics are used to sedate and control people in 
institutional settings, such as prisons and nursing homes, it is 
doubtful that a meaningful balancing of risks versus benefits is 
even contemplated: if it is, risks to the ward or patient seem to 
be given less weight than the benefit of alleviating burdens on 
institution staff-members. For any person not suffering from 
psychosis, justification for using antipsychotics in the risk/benefit 
analysis is quite thin. 
B.  Prevalence of Antipsychotic Use in Nonpsychotic Patient 
Population 
Diagnosis in the realm of psychiatry is inexact and imperfect, 
thus psychiatrists often face challenges in determining which 
medications will be appropriate for a particular patient. In 
instances where definitive diagnosis is difficult, it is not 
uncommon that a psychiatrist attempting to achieve the best 
outcome might prescribe multiple medications, some of them off 
label.220 Confronted with confusing or contradictory symptoms, 
 
217. Id. (citing Joanna Le Noury et al., The Incidence and Prevalence 
of Diabetes in Patients with Serious Mental Illness in North West 
Wales: Two Cohorts 1875–1924 and 1994–2006 Compared, 8 BMC 
PSYCHIATRY 67 (2004).). 
218. Id. 
219. Id. 
220. Andrew McKean & Erik Monasterio, Off-Label Use of Atypical 
Antipsychotics Cause for Concern?, 26 CNS DRUGS 383, 384, 
(2012) (citing D.C. Radley et al., Off-label Prescribing Among 
Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1021–26 (2006); 
D. Leslie et al., Off Label Use of Antipsychotic Medications in the 
Department of Veterans Affairs Health Care System, 60(9) 
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1175–81 (2009); Haw C & Stubbs J., A Survey 
of the Off-Label-Use of Mood Stabilizers in a Large Psychiatric 
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“physicians can pull from a hat some case from the past and make 
their recommendation, often leading to the patient’s recovery.”221 
But mechanisms by which psychiatrists gather information from 
and about patients are uncertain, and (even if obtained from the 
patient directly) the information may be unreliable and merely 
anecdotal.222 Misdiagnosis in psychiatry has been estimated to be 
as high as fifty percent, and nonpsychotic patients who may be 
perceived as exhibiting some symptoms of the disease, or none at 
all, may be prescribed antipsychotics inappropriately.223 
1. Just a Little Bit Can’t Hurt, Can it? 
Prescription of antipsychotics “should be restricted to only 
those patients for whom no alternative treatment is available.”224 
Increasingly, however, SGAs are prescribed as mood stabilizers. 
For example, FDA has granted approval for treating bipolar 
disorder with the following medications: Risperdal, Abilify and 
Seroquel.225 While some of the newer indications are approved by 
FDA, most are not. 
U.S. office-based psychiatrists increasingly are prescribing 
two or more psychotropic medications concurrently; the 
combination of antidepressants and antipsychotics is prevalent, 
and many times the antipsychotics are prescribed off label.226 This 
 
Hospital, 19 J. PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 402–7 (2005); K. Martin-
Latry et al., A One-Day Survey of Characteristics of Off-Label 
Hospital Prescription of Psychotropic Drugs, 40(3) 
PHARMACOPSYCHIATRY 116–20 (2007)). 
221. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF 
HOW LAW AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION 
MAKING 7 (2003). 
222. Id. 
223. McCarron, supra note 165, at 483 (footnotes omitted). 
224. Najib, supra note 101, at 443. 
225. HOLLAND, supra note 211, at 315. 
226. Lone Baandrup & Marie Kruse, Incident Users of Antipsychotics: 
Who Are They and How Do They Fare?, 51 SOC. PSYCHIATRY& 
PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 505, 506, 511 (2016) (citing R. 
Mojtabai & M. Olfson, National Trends in Psychotropic 
Medication Polypharmacy in Office-Based Psychiatry, 67 ARCH. 
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 26 (2010)). In addition to a lack of evidence of 
efficacy, the potential for drug-drug interactions and increased side 
effects is often a real but unnecessary burden on patients. Id. at 
511. 
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is often referred to as adjunctive therapy.227 A U.S. national 
survey concluded that efficacy was not proved for these off-label 
uses and risk-benefit ratios and outcomes were uncertain.228 
Efforts are needed to place limits on off-label uses of 
antipsychotics, reserving these uses for very specific and otherwise 
treatment-resistant conditions. 
While in some instances psychiatrists are prescribing lower 
doses for their nonpsychotic patients than they would for treating 
FDA-approved indications (for example, schizophrenia),229 lower 
doses of SGAs are not without risk. Still, these lower doses are 
commonly prescribed off label to “treat” anxiety, agitation, and 
insomnia, and there may be an assumption that the use of these 
drugs in lower doses will significantly mitigate risks of metabolic 
adverse effects.230 This assumption is faulty. Chronic, low-dose use 
of adjunctive antipsychotic medication in treating depression has 
been found to result in increased blood lipids, triglycerides and 
glucose, with attendant weight gain and increased risk of Type II 
diabetes.231 For example, one study looked at patients between 
ages nineteen and sixty-five who were prescribed low-dose 
quetiapine (mean daily dose of 120 mg at the end of the study) 
in treating insomnia: over an 11-month period there were 
significant changes in weight (mean increase of 4.9 pounds) and 
body mass index (mean increase of 0.8).232 Clearly, off-label use 
 
227. Id. at 506. 
228. Id. at 511. 
229. Antipsychotic Drugs a Last Resort for These 5 Conditions: Safety 
Issues Are a Concern When Used Off-Label to Treat Anxiety, 
ADHD, Depression, Insomnia, and PTSD, Our Analysis Finds, 
CONSUMER REPORTS (Dec. 2013), https://www.consumer
reports.org/cro/2013/12/treating-anxiety-adhd-depression-
insomnia-and-ptsd-with-newer-antipsychotics/index.htm [https://
perma.cc/R92Y-AMGQ] [hereinafter Antipsychotic Drugs a Last 
Resort]. 
230. McKean & Monasterio, supra note 220, at 387 (citing M. Cates et 
al., Metabolic Consequences of Using Low Dose Quetiapine for 
Insomnia in Psychiatric Patients, 45 CMTY. MENTAL HEALTH J. 
25M (2009)). 
231. Ping Wang, Use of Antipsychotics in the Treatment of Depressive 
Disorders, 25 SHANGHAI ARCHIVES OF PSYCHIATRY 134, 138 (2013). 
232. McKean & Monasterio, supra note 220, at 387 (citing M. Cates et 
al., Metabolic Consequences of Using Low Dose Quetiapine for 
Insomnia in Psychiatric Patients, 45 CMTY. MENTAL HEALTH J. 
25M (2009)); See also Holly V. Coe & Irene S. Hong, Safety of Low 
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of antipsychotics has potential to harm, but because these uses 
are not universally monitored or regulated, concrete information 
about side effects in the nonpsychotic population is not readily 
available.233 
2. Vulnerable Populations 
Particularly worrisome is the off-label prescription of 
antipsychotic drugs to members of vulnerable populations.234 
Most commonly, this is a situation in which there is no psychosis 
but perhaps a desire by psychiatrists, caretakers and society to 
control, keep still or quiet the patient. One might expect that the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) would set 
an example of proper standards for addressing potential 
vulnerability in the psychiatric community through the 
department’s regulation of human subjects research with this 
population. However, this is not the case.235 HHS, and FDA for 
that matter, have no special regulations governing research in the 
psychiatric patient population.236 Regarding criteria for IRB 
 
Doses of Quetiapine When Used for Insomnia, 46 THE ANNALS OF 
PHARMACOTHERAPY 718, 719 (2012). 
233. McKean & Monasterio, supra note 220, at 386. 
234. McCarron, supra note 165, at 484. 
235. With recent changes to the Common Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 28518, 
28518 (June 19, 2018) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 46), there is 
no longer reference to “mentally disabled” subjects. Now, “impaired 
decision-making capacity” has replaced “mentally disabled” as a 
new but likewise vague concept, and IRBs are tasked with 
delineating this concept on a protocol-by-protocol basis. See Elisa 
A. Hurley, From the Director: “Vulnerability” in the Revised 
Common Rule, AMP&RSAND (Sept. 12, 2017), https://blog.
primr.org/vulnerability-revised-common-rule [https://perma.cc/
6VXZ-CC74]. The revised Common Rule refers to impaired 
decision-making capacity in the context of subjects who are 
vulnerable to coercion or undue influence. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(b) 
(2019); As with the original Common Rule (45 C.F.R. pt. 46C, 
§ 46.111(a)(3)), the definition of vulnerability is difficult to pin 
down. For years, scholars have attempted to forge meaning where 
little guidance has been provided. See, e.g., David Wendler, A 
Pragmatic Analysis of Vulnerability in Research, 31 BIOETHICS 515, 
520 (2017). 
236. Philip T. Yanos et al., Research Risk for Persons with Psychiatric 
Disorders: A Decisional Framework to Meet the Ethical Challenge, 
60 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 374, 376 (2009). 
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approval in the context of clinical drug research, FDA regulations 
state: 
(b) When some or all of the subjects, such as children, 
prisoners, pregnant women, handicapped, or mentally 
disabled persons, or economically or educationally 
disadvantaged persons, are likely to be vulnerable to 
coercion or undue influence additional safeguards have 
been included in the study to protect the rights and welfare 
of these subjects.237 
Our federal research regulations provide no concrete 
instructions on how to protect mentally disabled or mentally ill 
individuals in research, nor is there any department or agency 
guidance regarding how to limit the risks to which these subjects 
may be exposed in clinical research.238 The term “mentally 
disabled persons” is not defined and could result in various 
interpretations. It might mean only instances involving 
permanent impairment of decision-making ability, for example, 
dementia or brain injury; or, it might also include other instances 
that involve temporary impairment, such as an episode of mania-
induced psychosis.239 Physicians, researchers and IRB members 
need more consistency and clarity in this area. This lack of clarity 
in the research setting is reflective of the wide deference that U.S. 
law has allowed psychiatrists in determinations relating to 
treatment of mentally ill patients.240 It is not a stretch to conceive 
 
237. Note that unlike the revised Common Rule, FDA’s regulation 
retains its reference to “mentally disabled persons.” 21 C.F.R. 
§ 56.111(b) (2019) (emphasis added). 
238. Resnik points to the diversity within the mentally disabled and 
mentally ill populations that makes it not necessarily appropriate 
to put them in categories: “[S]ome mentally ill or disabled adults 
may have good decision-making abilities, while others may not. 
Also, some may be able to make decisions under certain conditions 
. . . but not [under] others.” DAVID B. RESNIK, THE ETHICS OF 
RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS, 218, 227 (2018). 
239. See Lindy Marie Fields & James Douglas Calvert, Informed 
Consent Procedures with Cognitively Impaired Patients: A Review 
of Ethics and Best Practices, 69 PSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL 
NEUROSCI. 462, 463–64 (2015). 
240. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 200 (1927) (supporting a 
Virginia eugenics law, allowing sterilization of people deemed by 
physicians to be “mentally defective” “imbeciles.”); see also 
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222 n. 8 (1990) (involving 
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of the two disciplines—psychiatric clinical research and 
psychiatric clinical practice—as being inextricably intertwined in 
the eyes of the law. 
In the field of bioethics, there are various types of 
vulnerability that are considered to affect a patient’s decision 
making. The most relevant in the context of the psychiatrist-
patient relationship may be deferential vulnerability, cognitive 
vulnerability, economic vulnerability, and social vulnerability.241 
With deferential vulnerability “the subordination is affected not 
by formal hierarchies . . . but instead by informal ones [that may] 
be socially constructed,” for example, those related to “gender, 
race, or class inequalities,” or “inequalities of power and 
knowledge of the kind that occur in doctor-patient 
relationships.”242 Deferential vulnerability may often be subtle,243 
but is likely present in most psychiatrist-patient relationships. 
With cognitive vulnerability, a patient may lack the ability to 
understand, for a variety of reasons, the risks of using a drug off 
label. A patient may lack sophisticated education and resources 
for learning due to economic disadvantages. With social 
vulnerability, a patient might possess the “cognitive capacity to 
consent,” yet be part of a group perceived by society through the 
lens of stereotypes that deflate the value of these individuals, their 
interests, welfare and contributions to society.244 Psychiatrists are 
not immune to viewing patients through the lens of the 
stereotype. 
FDA vaguely affords protections for subjects suffering from 
mental illness by instructing IRBs to assure adequate safeguards 
for the undefined category of “mentally disabled” subjects who 
 
forced antipsychotic medication of incarcerated inmates) (“[W]e 
will not assume that physicians will prescribe [antipsychotics] for 
reasons unrelated to the medical needs of the patients; indeed, the 
ethics of the medical profession are to the contrary. This 
consideration supports our interpretation of the State’s Policy as 
ensuring that antipsychotic medications will be administered only 
in those cases where appropriate by medical standards.”) (citations 
omitted). 
241. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 141–44 (citing ETHICAL AND 
POLICY ISSUES IN RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS, 
NAT’L BIO. ADVISORY COMM’N 85–92 (2001)). 
242. Id. at 143 (emphasis in original). 
243. Id. 
244. Id. at 144. 
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are likely to be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence.245 
However, federal law leaves the potentially vulnerable psychiatric 
patient open to possible exploitation—intentional or not—by 
physicians who in clinical practice prescribe antipsychotic drugs 
never studied for their particular disease or population.246 
3. Children, Especially Foster Children 
Among the existing antipsychotics, risperidone (the generic 
for Risperdal) is the drug used most frequently in the child-
patient population.247 There has been little official research on the 
use of antipsychotic drugs in the child-patient population, 
particularly off-label uses.248 The consequence of this widespread 
off-label use is that many children are, in effect, enrolled “in a 
 
245. 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(3) (2019). 
246. Note that the Common Rule provides protections to everyone else, 
provided that the clinical study is connected to federal funding. 
While not applicable in the FDA setting, the revised Common Rule 
no longer aligns with FDA’s regulation. See COLEMAN ET AL., supra 
note 10, at 175–76 (“There are three ways in which a study might 
be subject to the federal regulations governing human subject 
protection: (1) the study is conducted or funded by the federal 
government; (2) the study is conducted at an institution that has 
agreed, in the assurance it entered into with the federal 
government, to apply the Common Rule to all research taking place 
at that institution; or (3) the study concerns something that brings 
it within the jurisdiction of the FDA.”). From the perspective of 
those who favor regulation, a compelling argument could be 
made—and perhaps has been made—regarding the chasm in 
protections for subjects in privately funded research that is neither 
drug related nor government funded, and the urgent need for 
protective action in this area. This inquiry is beyond the scope of 
the Article. 
247. JASLEEN SALWAN ET AL., APPLICATION FOR INCLUSION TO THE 19TH 
EXPERT COMMITTEE ON THE SELECTION AND USE OF ESSENTIAL 




248. Are Too Many Kids Taking Antipsychotic Drugs? Use Is Climbing 
Despite Questions About How Safe the Drugs Are and How Well 
They Work, CONSUMER REPS. (Dec. 2013), https://www.consumer
reports.org/cro/2013/12/are-too-many-kids-taking-antipsychotic-
drugs/index.htm [https://perma.cc/2SPL-PQ6X] [hereinafter Too 
Many Kids]. 
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sort of large, poorly controlled experiment.”249 Truly evidence-
based standards of care are required if there is any chance of 
understanding how best—if at all—to use psychotropic 
medications off label.250 Some scholars suggest that NIH, private 
foundations, and the pharmaceutical industry should “study long-
term clinical and developmental effects of antipsychotic use by 
children,251 and . . . support research on potentially safer 
pharmacological interventions, as well as psychosocial 
interventions for disruptive behavior and emotional disorders of 
children.”252 
In the early 2000s, fraudulent positive-clinical-trial results for 
the antidepressants Paxil and Zoloft allowed these two 
medications, later shown to cause suicidal thinking and addictive 
 
249. Id. 
250. Id. (citing Helen Egger, M.D., Chief of Child and Family Mental 
Health and Developmental Neuroscience in the Department of 
Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at Duke University Medical 
Center). 
251. Wacker et al., The Protection of Subjects in Clinical Research, in 
DRUG INJURY: LIABILITY, ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION, 95–109, 99 
(James T. O’Donnell ed., 3d ed. 2012) (“Despite the need for 
pediatric drug studies, many argue that clinical studies put children 
at risk, for a multitude of reasons. Others believe that the benefit 
outweighs the risk. After all, clinical trials place a small number of 
children at risk (in a controlled environment). Furthermore, the 
children enrolled in clinical studies will have illnesses and, therefore, 
stand to (hopefully) benefit from the experimental treatment. The 
ultimate benefit will be appropriate pediatric labeling for the drug 
and safe use on children in the future.”). In 2013, FDA adopted a 
final version of rules requiring that drug trials in the child 
population comply with Subpart D of HHS regulations, providing 
additional protections for research involving children. COLEMAN ET 
AL., supra note 10, at 592 (citing Food and Drug Administration, 
Additional Safeguards for Children in Clinical Investigations of 
Food and Drug Administration-Regulated Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 
12,937 (Feb. 26, 2013)). Research can (and probably should) be 
conducted in child populations with extra safeguards in place. See 
id. at 590–91. 
252. Use of Antipsychotic Medications for Nonpsychotic Children: Risks 
and Implications for Mental Health Services, in 18 THE BROWN 
UNIV. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY UPDATE 6 
(Mar. 2016) (Jeffrey I. Hunt, M.D. ed.) [hereinafter Brown Univ. 
Antipsychotics] (citing Daviss et al., Use of Antipsychotic 
Medications for Nonpsychotic Children: Risks and Implications for 
Mental Health Services, PSYCHIATRY SERV. (Jan. 4, 2016)). 
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qualities in children, to be prescribed off label to this vulnerable 
group.253 These examples of off-label antidepressant use in 
children showcase “the greatest known divide in medicine”—the 
discrepancies between what is reported in scientific literature and 
what raw data actually show—and this problem likely extends to 
all types of off-label treatments.254 This fraudulent activity shows 
“how far our scientific standards have slipped and how this 
impinges on our ability to care for some of the most vulnerable 
people there are.”255 
One of our most vulnerable populations, children in foster 
care or the juvenile justice system, are the most likely to be 
prescribed antipsychotic medication.256 A 2011 Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report found that in 2008, children 
in foster care in five sample states were prescribed antipsychotic 
drugs at higher rates than children not in the foster care 
system.257 The report found that foster children were sometimes 
four-and-a-half times more likely to be prescribed psychotropic 
medication than their non-foster child counterparts within the 
Medicaid system.258 The report also found that hundreds of 
children in the five states had drug regimens of five or more 
psychotropic drugs—including antipsychotics—despite the fact 
that there is no medical evidence supporting concurrent use of 
this many drugs by children.259 
 
253. WHITAKER & COSGROVE, supra note 124, at 102–07. 
254. HEALY—PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS, supra note 171, at 148–49. 
255. Id. (“[t]he published papers endorsing the use of Paxil, Prozac, and 
Zoloft remain in print in the best journals and continue to fuel a 
boom in off-label sales of these drugs to children. There have been 
efforts to get [the fraudulent] study retracted but these have failed. 
It continues to be built into guidelines supporting the use of 
antidepressants for children.”). 
256. Brown Univ. Antipsychotics, supra note 252, at 6. 
257. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-201, FOSTER 
CHILDREN: HHS GUIDANCE COULD HELP STATES IMPROVE 
OVERSIGHT OF PSYCHOTROPIC PRESCRIPTIONS 12 (2011) 
[hereinafter GAO-12-201]. The children studied in the GAO 
report—both those in foster care and not in foster care—were 
enrolled in the Medicaid programs of Florida, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Oregon, and Texas. Id. at 8. 
258. Smith, supra note 170. 
259. GAO-12-201, supra note 257, at 14. 
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The drastic increase (an approximate tripling) in 
prescriptions of antipsychotic drugs to children since the early 
2000s is not the result of a sudden schizophrenia epidemic or other 
forms of serious mental illness in children. Rather, it stems from 
doctors’ use of these medications to “treat” behavioral issues, a 
“treatment” that FDA has not approved.260 A disproportionate 
number of these prescriptions are being written for disadvantaged 
poor and minority children as young as age 2.261 Economically 
disadvantaged children are increasingly vulnerable to the effects 
of medications because of their developing brains and bodies, and 
also because of stigma attached to mental illness, 
behavioral/adjustment issues, and the condition of living in 
poverty.262 
According to a related 2015 Department of Health and 
Human Services Office of Inspector General (OIG) study on 
Medicaid-enrolled children, two or more quality-of-care concerns 
were found in 49 percent of claims for SGAs, and 53 percent of 
claims were identified as lacking monitoring for physiological and 
behavioral changes,263 including measuring of height and weight, 
taking vital signs and blood pressure, noting abnormal 
involuntary movements, ordering laboratory tests (for example, 
tests of liver function, and for blood glucose and lipid levels), and 
electrocardiograms.264 Amid the overwhelming lack of monitoring, 
reviewers identified failure of healthcare providers to recognize or 
manage side effects of antipsychotic use, such as akathisia, 
significant weight gain, insomnia, and edema.265 Only eight 
percent of claims made for SGAs were related to prescriptions for 
the “limited number of medically accepted pediatric 
 
260. Too Many Kids, supra note 248. 
261. Id. 
262. See id. 
263. U.S. DEP’T HHS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, OEI-07-12-00320 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: SECOND-GENERATION ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUG 
USE AMONG MEDICAID-ENROLLED CHILDREN: QUALITY-OF-CARE 
CONCERNS 5, 9, 12 (2015), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/
oei/reports/oei-07-12-00320.pdf [https://perma.cc/HV7X-5BKZ] 
[hereinafter OEI-07-12-00320]. The five States included in the OIG 
study were California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas. 
264. Id. at 12. 
265. Id. 
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indications.”266 Among the other ninety-two percent of claims, 
ones not related to prescriptions for medically recognized 
pediatric indications, SGAs most commonly were prescribed to 
treat “bipolar disorder (20 percent), mood disorders (13 percent), 
and autism spectrum disorders (8 percent).”267 While the state of 
New York’s Medicaid coverage policy mandated that payment 
would only issue for SGAs prescribed for “medically accepted 
indications,” the state program violated its own policy and paid 
over 3,300 claims, totaling $773,607.00.268 
Three of the SGAs included in the OIG study had FDA 
warnings about an increased chance of suicidal ideation and 
behavior in children, adolescents, and young adults being treated 
with these antipsychotics while suffering from major depressive 
disorder or other psychiatric disorders.269 However, FDA warnings 
do not prohibit physicians from prescribing drugs, despite specific 
warnings, if according to the physician’s judgment, the benefits 
outweigh the risks.270 Thirty-seven percent of claims identified in 
the study were for SGAs prescribed to treat the specific conditions 
about which FDA had warned: for major depressive and other 
psychiatric disorders.271 The report suggested that all children 
prescribed the warned-of antipsychotics, regardless of their 
precise diagnosis, need to be properly monitored for suicidal 
ideation and all other side effects.272 
It is common and legal for U.S. physicians to prescribe for 
children drugs that have only been approved for adults.273 The 
physician’s ethical dilemma is to withhold a drug that has not 
been proven safe but that may also be capable of curing disease 




268. Id. at 13. New York State Medicaid staff stated that because of the 
lack of diagnosis information on drug claims, the strict coverage 
policy was difficult to enforce absent a medical record review. 
269. Id. at 14. 
270. Id. 
271. Id. Notably, the broad sweeping “other psychiatric disorders” could 
apply to any child with any sort of mental health condition. 
272. Id. 
273. Wacker et al., supra note 251, at 99. 
274. Id. 
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with at least some level of evidence in treating a “small sub-group 
of youth with significant developmental disabilities,” off-label 
antipsychotic prescribing has been expanded to treatment of 
“cognitively normal” young people with a paucity of evidence on 
safety and efficacy.275 In comparing two studies, one looking at 
the period 2005-2009 and one from a decade earlier, antipsychotic 
prescription increased by approximately 85 percent in the child 
and adolescent population, a much higher increase than seen in 
the adult population.276 
Clinical trials support the efficacy of some antipsychotics for 
irritability associated with autism in adolescents and children; 
specifically, risperidone for children as young as age five, and 
aripiprazole for those six years old and up.277 Clinical research also 
supports the efficacy of certain antipsychotics in treating child 
and adolescent bipolar mania and schizophrenia.278 However, 
antipsychotics are not approved by FDA to treat attention-deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).279 Nonetheless, as of 2015, 
research280 noted that boys ages 11–17 diagnosed with ADHD 
 
275. Too Many Kids, supra note 248 (quoting David Rubin, M.D., 
Associate Professor of Pediatrics at the Perelman School of 
Medicine at the University of Pennsylvania). 
276. Id. 
277. Study Finds Most Young People Treated with Antipsychotics Lack 
MH Diagnosis, 25 MENTAL HEALTH WKLY., August 17, 2015, at 1 
(Valerie Canady et al., eds.) [hereinafter Mental Health Weekly] 
(citing Mark Olfson et al., Treatment of Young People with 
Antipsychotic Medications in the United States, 72 JAMA 
PYSCHIATRY 867 (2015)); see also Too Many Kids, supra note 248 
(“Schizophrenia is rarely diagnosed until adulthood, for example. 
Bipolar disorder is estimated to affect less than 3% of teens, 
according to the National Institute of Mental Health, but the exact 
prevalence is unknown because of its difficulty to diagnose in 
children. That’s partly because the symptoms are less clear and 
may overlap with other conditions such as ADHD. And while about 
one in 110 children have some form of autistic disorder, only about 
30% are affected by the aggressive impulse behavior antipsychotic 
drugs have been approved to treat.”). 
278. Id. 
279. Mental Health Weekly, supra note 277, at 2. 
280. Id. at 3 (“Researchers noted that in the merged 2009 medical claims 
and LRx sample, most of the younger children (60%), older children 
(56.7%), adolescents (62%) and young adults (67.1%) treated with 
antipsychotics had no outpatient or inpatient claim that included 
a mental health diagnosis. The study found that among 
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represented the highest use of antipsychotic treatments in the 
studied population.281 
There is concern among some in the psychiatrist community 
about the extent of off-label prescription of antipsychotics to 
children.282 While at risk for all the adverse side effects discussed 
above in the context of adult patients prescribed antipsychotics, 
both weight gain and hormonal changes occur more significantly 
in children than in adults.283 Additionally, the younger the patient 
prescribed antipsychotics off label is, “the more . . . [the drug] can 
affect the developing brain.”284 Especially in the context of 
children, long-term effects are harder to determine because their 
current life experience is short and cannot yet have been studied. 
Thus, risks have “not been assessed in longitudinal follow-up 
studies conducted with larger samples.”285 
Off-label use of antipsychotics in the child population is 
problematic because it is becoming commonplace, even while 
studies with this population are lacking. In the case of other drugs 
commonly prescribed off label for children, for example, to treat 
physical ailments, there is generally evidence of safety and 
efficacy through studies with adult populations. In the case of off-
label use of antipsychotics, there are no underlying studies with 
adults, so the drugs are not proven safe or effective in any age 
group. And yet, some of the most vulnerable in the U.S. 
population—children who are poor—could be viewed to be 
serving as “human subjects” in an unofficial experiment to test 
safety and efficacy—at no cost to pharmaceuticals manufacturers. 
 
antipsychotic-treated children and adolescents with mental 
disorder claims, the most common diagnosis was ADHD (younger 
children, 52.5%; older children, 60.1%; adolescents, 34.9%). 
Depression was the most common diagnosis among young adults 
(34.5%), followed by bipolar (26.6%) and anxiety disorder 
(22.9%).”). 
281. Id. at 2 (“Antipsychotics are used to manage aggression and other 
symptoms in ADHD.”). 
282. Minji Sohn et al., Nation Trends in Off-Label Use of Atypical 
Antipsychotics in Children and Adolescents in the United States, 
95 MED. 1, 1 (2016). 
283. Brown Univ. Antipsychotics, supra note 252, at 5. 
284. Too Many Kids, supra note 248 (quoting Christopher Bellonci, 
M.D., Assistant Professor at Tufts University School of Medicine). 
285. Brown Univ. Antipsychotics, supra note 252, at 5. 
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4. The Elderly and Poor 
Although studies show an increased risk of death for elderly 
patients taking antipsychotic drugs, nursing home physicians 
across the United States continue to prescribe these drugs to 
“treat” psychosis and behavioral problems caused by dementia.286 
All antipsychotic drug labels carry the strongest warning, called 
a “black box” warning, about the risk of stroke and death when 
taken by patients with dementia.287 
In the context of evaluating Medicare claims, the OIG study 
above noted that an earlier OIG report on SGA prescriptions for 
elderly nursing-home residents found that fourteen percent of 
those residents had Medicare claims for SGAs.288 Eighty-three 
percent of them were prescribed SGAs off label, and eighty-eight 
percent were for the very conditions identified in the FDA-
mandated black-box warning, like dementia.289 Further, the 
investigation found that over one-in-five Medicare claims for 
antipsychotics failed to comply with federal guidelines that 
prohibit unnecessary or excessive medication of persons in nursing 
homes.290 
It is often the case that antipsychotics are prescribed and 
administered to elderly patients, especially those in nursing 
homes, in order to sedate and confine the resident—which lessens 
the care-burden on staff. Treating a mental illness like 
schizophrenia is generally not the purpose.291 According to the 
most recent APA guidelines on using antipsychotics to treat 
agitation or psychosis in dementia patients, these drugs should 
only be used in emergency settings when symptoms are severe 
and situations dangerous.292 Yet, interestingly, under Medicare’s 
 
286. McCarron, supra note 165, at 484. 
287. Antipsychotic Drugs a Last Resort, supra note 229. 
288. OEI-07-12-00320, supra note 263, at 6. 
289. Id. 
290. Smith, supra note 170. 
291. See HUM. RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 191. 
292. Martin R. Farlow & Tatyana A. Shamliyan, Benefits and Harms 
of Atypical Antipsychotics for Agitation in Adults with Dementia, 
27 EUR. NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 217–231 (2017) (citing V.I. 
Reus et al., The American Psychiatric Association Practice 
Guideline on the Use of Antipsychotics to Treat Agitation or 
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Part D prescription-drug plan, antipsychotics are one of six drugs 
considered to belong to a “protected class,” meaning that 
“permissive compendium ratings may virtually guarantee 
reimbursement of off-label prescription claims.”293 
In the case of poor families, they may lack resources and the 
ability for self-advocacy, and prescribers may opt to use 
antipsychotics as a quick and inexpensive fix to control 
behavior.294 Economically disadvantaged people may lack access 
to mental health professionals who provide psychosocial 
interventions,295 either because these professionals do not practice 
in underserved neighborhoods, or they do but their fees are 
exorbitant and prohibitive.296 
A lack of financial resources appears to be a relevant factor 
in the likelihood that one will be prescribed an antipsychotic off 
label. Also significant is one’s ability to self-advocate, or the 
absence of such ability. Elderly persons living in nursing homes, 
children, and people who are economically disadvantaged lack 
agency due to various circumstances—confinement to the facility 
due to infirmity, no legal autonomy, and insufficient financial 
means for alternative treatment—and this makes these groups 
uniquely vulnerable to receiving prescriptions for drugs that are 
not supported by evidence of safety and efficacy. 
This section reviewed the ways in which antipsychotics use 
has been pushed to the limits, and beyond. Medications that were 
originally developed to treat a specific set of symptoms and 
certain severe mental illnesses have quietly gained legitimacy for 
the treatment of less burdensome diseases, with no evidence of 
safety and efficacy. The balancing of risks and benefits, especially 
where serious and long-lasting side effects are implicated, should 
become a very different equation in the case of the psychiatric 
 
Psychosis in Patients with Dementia, 173 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 543–
546 (2016)). 
293. Richard P. Paczynski et al., Quality of Evidence in Drug 
Compendia Supporting Off-Label Use of Typical and Atypical 
Antipsychotic Medications, 24 INT’L J. RISK & SAFETY MED. 137, 
143 (2012). 
294. Brown Univ. Antipsychotics, supra note 252, at 6. 
295. Id. 
296. See Too Many Kids, supra note 248 (citing David Rubin, M.D., 
Associate Professor of Pediatrics at the Perelman School of 
Medicine at the University of Pennsylvania). 
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patient who does not suffer from psychosis. But the market is 
growing exponentially, and beginning with the elderly and the 
poor, the U.S. government, through Medicare and Medicaid, is 
subsidizing this expansive use at no cost to drug manufacturers. 
The questions next addressed are how did we get here, and where 
were the regulators? 
III. Off-Label Safety and Efficacy: Who’s Really 
in Charge Here? 
Significant evidence shows that pharmaceuticals 
manufacturers manipulated and corrupted clinical trial data and 
“purchased” expert consensus guidelines for the indications and 
patient populations ultimately receiving FDA approval relating 
to antipsychotics, i.e., treatment of psychosis in the patient 
population suffering from schizophrenia.297 Because these data on 
safety and efficacy were distorted for the intended treatment 
purpose and population, this creates an even more suspect and 
potentially dangerous outcome for patients prescribed these drugs 
off label. 
A.  Anecdotal “Evidence” 
The types of professional writings often laying the 
groundwork for future, rampant off-label uses range from medical 
journal articles describing substantive clinical research on 
evidence-based off-label uses to anecdotal clinical case studies 
regarding “successful” individual off-label use.298 Determining the 
true sources of information can be a challenge, as ghostwriting is 
a critical problem. In the medical setting, ghostwriting occurs 
where the actual author of a medical article is not credited—
thought by some scholars to be an effort to veil pharmaceutical 
industry involvement and create an appearance of sponsorship by 
academia.299 Under such arrangements, a medical writer drafts the 
article and it is attributed to a prominent doctor, often one at a 
major university. While scientific journals often inform about 
official clinical study results, there are other types of scientific 
writings, such as editorials, letters to editors, and review 
 
297. WHITAKER & COSGROVE, supra note 124, at 149–50. 
298. Barkus & Derian, supra note 20, at 863. 
299. See ELLIOTT, supra note 86, at 33; see also WHITAKER & COSGROVE, 
supra note 124, at 158–59. 
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articles.300 These ghostwritten articles and letters influence 
physicians’ decisions to prescribe drugs off label.301 It is estimated 
that off-label prescription decision-making is informed by these 
ghostwritten articles in “up to half of all medical prescriptions—
and more for children.”302 Notably, in the cases of the 
antidepressants Paxil and Zoloft,303 ghostwriters produced all of 
the published studies.304 
In our culture, there is a tendency to associate science with 
truth, and commerce as something that needs some regulation by 
government.305 “The tension between science and commerce”306 is 
present at the intersection of the practice of medicine and the 
business of major pharmaceutical companies. There seems to be 
a general inclination in the U.S. to extend the notion that “science 
is truth” to “scientists are truthful.”307 Science, however, is quite 
commercialized.308 A pharmaceuticals company will hire science 
writers to present the company in the light it desires, and 
favorable opinions are an assumed condition of continued 
employment.309 Despite this potential bias, the physician “author” 
may give the article only a cursory review before signing her name 
to it. These articles have wide and enduring impacts, often 
 
300. ELLIOTT, supra note 86, at 36 (“Review articles . . . summarize the 
current state of knowledge about an illness or a therapy based on 
the author’s reading of the published literature.”). Elliott notes, 
however, that not all ghostwriting is unethical. Id. 
301. HEALY—PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS, supra note 171, at 110–11. 
302. Id. at 111. 
303. See discussion supra, Part II.B.3. 
304. Id. at 149. 
305. See generally, id. at 128. 
306. ELLIOTT, supra note 86, at 34. 
307. Id.  
308. Id.; see also Anthony Fletcher & Philip Bourne, Ten Simple Rules 
to Commercialize Scientific Research, 8 PLOS COMPUTATIONAL 
BIOLOGY 1 (2012). 
309. ELLIOTT, supra note 86, at 36 (quoting medical writer David 
Bronstein (pseudonym)). Many in the industry view the medical 
ghostwriter as similar to a secretary, or, being generous, as an 
editor. Id. at 33. 
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informing decisions on inclusion of off-label uses in the 
pharmaceuticals compendia.310 
Some scholars assert that institutional corruption within 
psychiatric professional organizations affects formulation of 
consensus practice guidelines (CPGs).311 While the APA’s mission 
is “to provide ‘humane care and effective treatment for all persons 
with mental disorders,’” pharmaceutical-company funding and 
guild interests are alleged to have compromised that public health 
agenda.312 Rather than meeting its obligations to society to 
conduct objective research and disseminate only “fully accurate 
information on the efficacy and safety of [antipsychotic] 
medications,” the APA has allowed (and in some instances 
facilitated) distortions of “scientific truths” that have led to 
“significant social injury.”313 Prior to issuance of CPGs, experts 
in the field may create “consensus guidelines” that influence 
treatment, and corruption also has been documented at this 
point.314 
Whether included in the compendia or not, a well-intentioned 
individual psychiatrist may read a peer-reviewed journal article—
funded by the pharmaceuticals industry and sanctioned by the 
APA or leaders in the field—and believe he is educating himself 
about current trends and successes with a particular off-label 
treatment. Thus, individual-practice psychiatrists who are “surely 
motivated to see their patients do well, are harmed by this 
corruption, as well.”315 Some physicians will rely on “experience, 
anecdotal reports, and opinion leaders to guide their treatment 
 
310. See, e.g., id. at 37–38. 
311. WHITAKER & COSGROVE, supra note 124, at 148–49. 
312. Id. at 4–7. 
313. Id. at 5–6. 
314. Id. at 149–50 (discussing Janssen’s unrestricted $450,000 grant to 
three leading academic institutions that employed three prominent 
academic psychiatrists who “coincidentally” produced an expert 
consensus guideline on the use of Janssen’s Risperdal as a first-line 
treatment for schizophrenia, later published in the Journal of 
Clinical Psychiatry; through another financial arrangement with 
the three psychiatrists, it is alleged that Janssen paid them over 
$425,000 for speaking engagements to influence state governments’ 
and providers’ adoption of the consensus guideline 
recommendations). 
315. Id. at 159. 
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decisions, often failing to demand solid evidence for their 
prescribing practices.”316 Alone—with no malfeasance on the part 
of pharmaceuticals manufacturers or abdication of responsibility 
on the part of the APA—this professional approach to clinical 
knowledge can lead to widespread inappropriate prescribing.317 
Whether or not “bad actors” have intentionally manipulated 
prescribing practices, psychiatrists prescribe antipsychotics off 
label to nonpsychotic patients with no solid research basis. This 
has cascaded into widespread acceptance of this off-label use and, 
ultimately, has modified the standard of care. 
B.  Compendia May be Informed by Ghostwriting and 
Unsubstantiated Evidence 
As stated above, “scholarly” articles that may be improperly 
influenced by the pharmaceuticals industry, and allowed by either 
the academic psychiatrist’s inattention to detail or his greed, 
often inform decisions about whether to include off-label uses in 
the pharmaceuticals compendia. Compendia are compilations 
that “describe the evidence and make recommendations regarding 
different therapeutic applications of FDA-approved drugs.”318 
Congress and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) have officially designated several of the compendia as 
authoritative to inform determinations regarding off-label 
prescription drug coverage.319 Both public and private insurers use 
the drug compendia in making coverage determinations and the 
compendia are regarded by some as having “de facto authority in 
off-label reimbursement decisions across a variety of therapeutic 
 
316. Dresser & Frader, supra note 115, at 479–80 (arguing that the 
medical community has a responsibility to rectify situations where 
off-label uses lack adequate evidentiary bases, stating that “[h]igh 
quality evidence about off-label applications not only protects 
patients from harmful and ineffective interventions, it increases 
their access to beneficial treatments.”). 
317. Id. 
318. Paczynski et al., supra note 293, at 137. 
319. Id. 
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classes.”320 But evidence in the compendia has received scant 
scrutiny and can be of poor quality.321 
Clearly, the compendia play an essential role today in 
evidence synthesis, coverage decisions, and prescription 
utilization. Greater oversight and effort must be committed to 
improving both the quality of evidence and transparency of its 
evaluation as contained in the compendia.322 But it may already 
be too late, as certain states have a preference favoring off-label 
uses. For example, a New Hampshire statute requires payment of 
insurance claims for off-label prescriptions if those non-approved 
indications are listed in the compendia.323 This statute provides 
guaranteed coverage for non-indicated uses so long as they are 
included in one of the compendia or “medical literature,” which, 
as discussed above, can be easily influenced by manufacturers 
through ghostwritten articles later used as “evidence” of safety 
and efficacy. This statutory scheme eliminates a potential 
oversight role for insurance companies, and leaves drug 
manufacturers in the driver’s seat. 
C.  Unfairness of Burdening Large Pharmaceuticals Manufacturers 
There are valid safety and efficacy concerns about introducing 
mind-altering chemicals approved for treating psychosis into the 
 
320. Id. at 143. 
321. Id. at 138; see also Dresser & Frader, supra note 115, at 479 
(discussing a review of Medicare-approved compendia that found a 
lack of consistency, quality, transparency and timeliness). 
322. See Dresser & Frader, supra note 115, at 479. CMS’s Medicare 
Evidence Development and Coverage Advisory Committee issued 
guidelines in 2007 on ways to improve information quality and to 
rationalize processes associated with including citations relating to 
off-label therapies in the compendia, however, these guidelines 
primarily applied to drugs used off-label in treating cancer. 
Paczynski et al., supra note 293, at 138. 
 
323. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 415:6-g (1997) (“I. No insurer that issues 
or renews any individual policy of accident or health insurance 
providing benefits for medical or hospital expenses and providing 
coverage for prescription drugs shall: (a) Exclude coverage for any 
such drug for a particular indication on the ground that the drug 
has not been approved by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) for that indication, if such drug is recognized for treatment 
of such indication in one of the standard reference compendia or in 
the medical literature.”). 
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mind of nonpsychotic patients. Multiple studies that compared 
adverse events relating to approved versus off-label drug uses 
have shown that there is a higher incidence of adverse drug 
reactions among patients prescribed medications for off-label 
purposes.324 However, some engaged in the debate surrounding 
off-label uses suggest it is not reasonable to expect 
pharmaceuticals companies to devote time and financial resources 
to support additional clinical trials to prove the safety and 
efficacy of approved drugs for additional purposes.325 
Those making such assertions offer the rationale that after 
spending hundreds of millions of dollars supporting the drug’s 
original New Drug Application (NDA), a requirement for 
additional studies would necessitate replication of efforts and 
would cost manufacturers additional “hundreds of millions of 
dollars in new testing and take years.”326 But this is not 
necessarily true. For example, there exists an abbreviated 
pathway under FDCA §505(b)(2) for approval of drugs, where an 
“applicant is not restricted to reliance on published studies, but 
may also rely on previous FDA findings of safety and efficacy for 
another applicant’s drug based on unpublished data in FDA’s 
files that is no longer legally protected.”327 The 505(b)(2) 
application also could be used where “an applicant that seeks to 
market its version of an established drug for a new therapeutic 
indication or with some other modification requiring new clinical 
studies [wishes to] rely on relevant safety findings on the drug in 
 
324. Aishwarya Vijay et al., Patterns and Predictors of Off-Label 
Prescription of Psychiatric Drugs, 13(7) PLOS ONE 2 (2018). 
325. Michael Ollove, Pressure Mounts to Lift FDA Restrictions on Off-




term=.46e5b955401e [https://perma.cc/B4GQ-LX28] (reporting 
views of Peter Pitts, president and co-founder of the Center for 
Medicine in the Public Interest, a nonprofit research and advocacy 
organization funded by the pharmaceutical industry). 
326. Id. 
327. Geoffrey M. Levitt, The Drugs/Biologics Approval Process, in A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FDA’S FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND 
REGULATION 125, 160 (Kenneth R. Piňa & Wayne L. Pines, eds., 
2017). 
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a previously approved NDA.”328 If the 505(b)(2) process is not 
unduly burdensome for companies that want to market an 
approved drug for a new indication, then why would it be unduly 
burdensome to require the same of the original drug sponsor in 
order for their approved drug to be used for a new indication? 
This option would substantially decrease the cost-burden on the 
original drug sponsor,329 while also allowing for FDA oversight in 
the matter.330 It is illogical that the original sponsor is allowed to 
bypass FDA scrutiny through off-label uses from which the 
sponsor reaps financial rewards, and that FDA instead gives 
deference to determinations that may be supported only by a 
physician’s ill-informed beliefs about safety and efficacy. 
In the context of the off-label promotion debate, those 
opposing such promotion argue that if a drug has not been FDA-
approved for off-label uses, then the drug manufacturer has not 
provided evidence of safety and efficacy for those other uses.331 In 
opposing off-label promotion, FDA itself has taken the stance 
 
328. Id. (emphasis added). 
329. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPLICATIONS COVERED BY 
SECTION 505(B)(2): DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 3 (1999) 
(“This use of section 505(b)(2), described in the regulations at 21 
CFR 314.54, was intended to encourage innovation without 
creating duplicate work.”). Note that this reference from 1999 was 
draft Guidance. 
330. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.54 (2019), which states: 
 PART 314—APPLICATIONS FOR FDA APPROVAL TO MARKET A NEW 
DRUG. § 314.54 Procedure for submission of a 505(b)(2) application 
requiring investigations for approval of a new indication for, or 
other change from, a listed drug. (a) The Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act does not permit approval of an ANDA [Abbreviated 
New Drug Application, used for generics manufacturing] for a new 
indication, nor does it permit approval of other changes in a listed 
drug if investigations, other than bioavailability or bioequivalence 
studies, are essential to the approval of the change. Any person 
seeking approval of a drug product that represents a modification 
of a listed drug (for example, a new indication or new dosage form) 
and for which investigations, other than bioavailability or 
bioequivalence studies, are essential to the approval of the changes 
may, except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, submit a 
505(b)(2) application. This 505(b)(2) application need contain only 
that information needed to support the modification(s) of the listed 
drug. 
331. Ollove, supra note 325 (quoting Allison Zieve, director of the 
litigation group at Public Citizen). 
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that off-label promotion may result in patients (1) being 
prescribed unproven therapies, or (2) being prescribed therapies 
with less efficacy or more risk than FDA-approved therapies.332 
FDA stands firm behind its concern that off-label promotion may 
disincentivize pharmaceutical companies from conducting 
additional safety and efficacy studies.333 These same arguments 
could be made in the context of off-label prescription. 
D.  Psychiatrists Behind Closed Doors 
During the nineteenth century, research mostly was 
conducted on a small scale, “with individual physicians trying out 
one or another remedy or procedure on a handful of persons.”334 
Experimentation began in the investigator’s home, using his own 
body, or those of relatives and neighbors.335 While 
experimentation in current times brings to mind large-scale 
studies sponsored by pharmaceuticals manufacturers, much of off-
label prescription is experimental in nature. The individual 
psychiatrist tinkers with different psychotropic medications—
including antipsychotics—attempting to treat or manage a 
nonpsychotic patient’s mental ailments. This is perfectly legal: 
But when experimentation in medical practice336 means 
potentially altering the core of a person’s being—the mind—there 
should be some sort of heightened oversight. 
1. Innovative Treatment or Experimentation? 
Off-label use sometimes constitutes the best treatment for 
certain patients under given circumstances and may also provide 
an important means of discovering effective new 
therapies.337 Scholars of research ethics understand how difficult 
 
332. Wayne Pines, Regulation of Promotion and Distribution, in A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FDA’S FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND 
REGULATION 439, 440, (Kenneth R. Piňa & Wayne L. Pines, eds., 
2017). 
333. Id. 
334. Rothman, supra note 221, at 21. 
335. Id. 
336. See Mithani, supra note 1, at 577 (noting the Fenfluramine example 
discussed, supra, at Part I.B.). 
337. See Dresser & Frader, supra note 115, at 476; Stoffelmayr, supra 
note 37, at 279 (citing Christopher, supra note 104, at 249 (for the 
statement that anecdotal evidence from general practice medicine 
suggests off-label use often “leads to serendipitous drug discovery”) 
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it can be to draw clear distinctions between human 
experimentation and medical treatment, and that innovation that 
is neither clearly research nor treatment makes discerning those 
distinctions even more difficult.338 One could argue that given the 
theoretical assumptions of the prescribing physician and the lack 
of scientific support, off-label prescription itself should be 
categorized as “experimental or investigational,” and this 
categorization would then mandate that physicians obtain 
consent similar to that required in research—most likely 
written—from patients.339 Might there be a middle ground, 
requiring more than regular patient consent but less than the 
consent mandated in clinical drug trials? 
The essential question is, in using antipsychotic medications 
off-label in private practice, when does the individual 
psychiatrist’s treatment of the individual patient become less 
about treatment and more about innovation, or, taken a step 
further, actual experimentation? Some scholars assert that 
physicians are conducting uncontrolled and unregulated 
experimentation within private practice; that patients are being 
experimented on because clinical research prior to clinical use is 
lacking.340 As Dr. Sidney Wolf of Public Citizen observed, “huge 
numbers of people are going to be made guinea pigs for 
unapproved uses of drugs.”341 Others believe, however, that there 
is nothing to fear. For example, one U.S. Senator—who was also 
 
and Shapiro, supra note 104, at 809 (“effective off-label drug uses 
may be discovered when physicians try therapies based on informal 
theorizing, or when a patient with multiple conditions receives a 
drug to treat one condition and another condition unexpectedly 
improves as well.”)). 
338. King, supra note 64, at 573. 
339. Mithani, supra note 1, at 578; see also Barkus & Derian, supra note 
20, at 863. 
340. Johns, supra note 27, at 979 (quoting Paul D. Stolley, Chair of 
Epidemiology and Preventative Medicine, University of Maryland 
School of Medicine). 
341. O’Reilly & Dalal, supra note 92, at 307; see JM Beck & ED Azari, 
FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and 
Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 71, 104 (1998) (quoting 
Christopher, supra note 104, at 255, explaining that federal 
regulations requiring informed consent for FDA trials do not apply 
to off-label treatments); see also Teo, supra note 35, at 319, 323. 
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a physician—offered reassurance from the Senate floor that 
amounted to paternalistic “because I say so” reasoning: 
I have some responsibility to define for my colleagues what 
off-label means. Off-label scares people. Is it somebody 
going in some secret closet and pulling out a medicine and 
using it? No, it is not. That is why extra-label is probably 
a better term. But right now off-label is something that we 
in the medical profession understand is used routinely in 
the pediatric population and, as mentioned earlier, for 
inpatient hospitalization. Probably 50 percent of all 
pediatric drugs prescribed are off-label. So it is not a term 
to be scared of or to fear.342 
In the context of surgery, innovation and improvisation are 
expected, partly because each patient’s anatomy is unique. Yet, 
medicine’s history is replete with examples of “medical innovators 
from all specialties, and popular culture likewise abounds with 
images of the physician-scientist as Lone Ranger.”343 Perhaps 
innovation is common in the realm of psychopharmacologic 
practice, where one FDA-approved antidepressant works to treat 
one patient’s depression and another approved antidepressant 
does not. Because of this, the psychiatrist’s approach must often 
be “let’s try and see” if a given psychotropic medication will be 
effective for this particular patient. But when moving outside of 
FDA-approved uses of a psychotropic, such as the antipsychotic 
Risperdal, and prescribing and introducing the drug’s chemicals 
into a lucid mind, is this a step too far? Is there, or should there 
be, a distinction between trying to eradicate a bacterial infection 
or cancerous cells that are not supposed to be in the patient’s 
body with a drug not approved for such purposes—when nothing 
else works—and introducing mind-altering chemicals into the 
 
342. 143 CONG. REC. S8165 (daily ed. July 28, 1997) (statement of Sen. 
Frist). 
343. King, supra note 64, at 574 n. 8 (“Even the FDA ‘treads lightly 
upon the practice of medicine and surgery,’ thus implicitly 
encouraging this overwhelmingly positive view of unregulated 
innovation” (quoting Philip D. Noguchi, From Jim to Gene and 
Beyond: An Odyssey of Biologics Regulation, 51 FOOD & DRUG L. 
J. 367, 392 (1996)). 
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patient’s blood system that will change the part of the patient 
that uniquely defines her?344 
This sort of tinkering with a person’s essence is more suspect, 
and more in need of regulation. But the regulators are nowhere 
to be found. This leaves the individual psychiatrist with a great 
deal of power and discretion, and too often that discretion may 
be informed by “scientific support” that is manufactured by drug 
manufacturers. 
2. Our Most Vulnerable in Effect “Subjects” in Private Practice 
“Clinical Trials” 
Introducing chemicals into any person’s brain should be done 
with great care and knowledge and should never amount to a 
mere guess regarding safety and efficacy. But patients seem to 
“receive the least regulatory protection in those cases where they 
may need it the most—namely, when individual physicians may 
haphazardly try out a different technique under the guise of 
providing innovative therapy.”345 Just as with actual clinical trials 
for a new drug or non-indicated use of an existing drug, targeting 
vulnerable persons for disproportionate inclusion or exclusion in 
studies is never appropriate.346 The same argument applies when 
a certain vulnerable group or categories of vulnerable populations 
are disproportionately prescribed a drug, such as an 
antipsychotic, off label. This is precisely what is happening, 
however, to the poor, the elderly, and children in foster care. 
Collectively, these vulnerable individuals could be likened to 
uninformed “subjects” in unregulated private practice “clinical 
trials.”  
The concept of individualized treatment in good medical 
practice informs the physician’s ethical mandate to promote an 
individual patient’s best interests and to respect his or her 
 
344. Gabriel Lazaro-Munoz, Responsible Translation of Psychiatric 
Genetics and Other Neuroscience Developments: In Need of 
Empirical Bioethics Research, 17 AM. J. BIOETHICS 33, 33 (2017) 
(quoting PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL 
ISSUES 11 (2014)) (“When you start tinkering with the 
brain . . . it’s really tinkering with who you are.”). 
345. Johns, supra note 27, at 979 (citing Lars Noah, Informed Consent 
and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and Experimental 
Therapy, 28 AM. J. L. & MED. 361, 392–93, 399–400 (2002)). 
346. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 146. 
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autonomy.347 A focus on the health and best interests of individual 
patients is what distinguishes medicine from public health which, 
instead, is concerned with the well-being of an entire community 
or population.348 As noted by one prominent physician, “the 
practice of medicine is carried out ‘on an individual basis, with 
the best interests of the patient foremost in the practitioner’s 
mind.’”349 In contrast, FDA stresses that clinical research is 
designed to answer specific questions through experimentation 
with numerous research volunteers.350 Other differences 
highlighted by FDA are that clinical research requires written 
informed consent and periodic, systematic assessment of patient 
data, whereas medical treatment sometimes requires no informed 
consent at all and patient assessment is done only as needed.351 
Finally, in addressing the concept of “certainty,” FDA states that 
while research “tests products and procedures of unproven benefit 
 
347. Zettler, supra note 55, at 437 (citing BERNARD LO, RESOLVING 
ETHICAL DILEMMAS: A GUIDE FOR CLINICIANS 12–14 (5th ed. 2013)); 
cf. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
(finding that physicians have a duty to obtain informed consent 
from patients because “every human being of adult years and sound 
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own 
body”); see Samia A. Hurst & Marion Danis, A Framework for 
Rationing by Clinical Judgment, 17 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 247, 
248–51 (2007) (discussing physicians’ obligations to both ration 
healthcare resources and advocate for patients’ best interests)); see 
also Teo, supra note 35, at 324. 
348. Zettler, supra note 55, at 437 (citing LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC 
HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 4 (2d ed. 2008)); see 
COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, INST. 
OF MED., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 3 (1988) (noting that 
“public health does things that benefit everybody”); see also 
Onyebuchi A. Arah, On The Relationship between Individual and 
Population Health, 12 MED. HEALTH CARE & PHIL. 235, 235 (2009) 
(contending that “population health calls up images of non-
individual health”). 
349. Id. at 437 (quoting Jeffrey M. Drazen, Government in Medicine, 
356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2195, 2195 (2007)). 
350. Clinical Research Versus Medical Treatment, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/patients/clinical-trials-what-
patients-need-know/clinical-research-versus-medical-treatment 
[https://perma.cc/Z69C-CVZJ] (last updated Mar. 22, 2018). 
351. Id. 
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to the patient,” medical treatment “uses products and procedures 
accepted by the medical community as safe and effective.”352 
Though FDA has elected a hands-off approach to regulating 
the practice of medicine, when that practice—intentional or not—
is no longer treating the individual but instead certain classes of 
patients who coincidently are vulnerable, what principles should 
apply? This appears to be an instance of innovation bordering on 
experimentation (as opposed to individual treatment) with 
vulnerable classes of patients as subjects. If FDA continues to 
abstain from intervening, then one possible solution would be for 
Congress to amend the FDCA. A focal point of any amendment 
should be the Belmont Report’s distinction between medical 
practice and research,353 with specific emphasis on the concept 
that a medical-practice intervention should be reasonably 
expected to succeed.354 If off-label prescription of antipsychotics 
has no scientifically based evidence of safety and efficacy, then it 
is not “reasonable” to believe that these drugs will be “successful” 
in treating the nonpsychotic patient. Any amendment should 
address this hybrid of the practice of medicine and conducting 
research.355 
3. Likelihood that Vulnerable Populations Avail Themselves of 
State-Law Remedies 
Some commentators believe there is no need for federal 
regulation: the “freedom accorded to physicians does not go 
unsupervised, because the fear of tort liability and medical 
malpractice claims serves as a check on the prescribing practices 
of physicians.”356 As discussed above, there are many hurdles over 
which a plaintiff-patient must leap in order to prevail in the 
courtroom. These obstacles are magnified in situations involving 
vulnerable populations who are suffering from some sort of mental 
 
352. Id. 
353. King, supra note 64, at 573 (citing to THE BELMONT REPORT, supra 
note 64) (“The Belmont Report defines medical practice as 
‘interventions that are designed solely to enhance the well-being of 
an individual . . . and that have a reasonable expectation of 
success.’”). 
354. Id. 
355. A more apt description might be “the practice of research.” 
356. O’Reilly & Dalal, supra note 92, at 299; see also Teo, supra note 
35, at 319, 322. 
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illness and who are taking antipsychotics with various adverse 
side effects. Civil litigation in such circumstances is a weak 
solution to a hefty problem and places the onus on the debilitated 
mental-health patient to stand up and fight. 
If the nonpsychotic psychiatric patient is even aware of being 
harmed by an antipsychotic, then the synergistic effects of the 
psychiatric illness—depression, for example, where the patient 
may lack motivation, have recluse-like behaviors, feel defeated, 
and be unable to work—and the sedating nature of the 
antipsychotic will render the patient unable to summon the 
energy, drive, or financial means necessary to pursue litigation. 
Attempts to right the wrong done to the patient are extremely 
unlikely. The patient-plaintiff must somehow have the emotional 
and financial resources (or the ability to locate and retain free 
counsel through a legal advocacy group) to pursue litigation and 
the mental wherewithal to withstand the rigors and repercussions 
of litigation. Clearly, the hurdles for any monetary recovery are 
exceedingly high. 
Further, in cases of children (especially foster children) and 
the elderly (who are dependent on others for daily needs and care, 
and who lack agency due to age, status, or confinement to a 
nursing home), the likelihood of these patients availing 
themselves of remedies at law is extremely low. For poor patients 
receiving health care through Medicaid, it may be fair to assume 
that they lack the resources needed to initiate legal action in order 
to recover for harm suffered from taking antipsychotics off label. 
Regardless of who is ultimately held liable (if anyone or any 
entity is, at all) the patient-plaintiff in a medical malpractice suit 
must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the physician’s 
negligence by establishing that: (1) the physician had a duty to 
care for the patient; (2) the physician breached that duty; (3) the 
injuries caused were the direct and proximate result of the 
physician’s breach; and (4) the patient’s injuries are compensable 
damages resulting from the physician’s malpractice.357 Perhaps 
some of the most difficult elements in medical malpractice cases 
are where a plaintiff must demonstrate a causal connection 
between the injury suffered and the physician’s failure to obtain 
informed consent or follow the standard of care.358 And then, of 
course, the patient-plaintiff must locate and pay a forensic “non-
 
357. Najib, supra note 101, at 443 (footnotes omitted). 
358. Barkus & Derian, supra note 20, at 863. 
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treating expert” to testify that there was a misdiagnosis of the 
condition and that treatment protocol for the correct diagnosis 
would not have invoked use of the psychotropic drug in 
question.359 Any legal victory would turn on expert testimony 
establishing that prescription of the specific offending off-label 
treatment demonstrated the physician’s lack of skill or 
knowledge, or failure to exercise reasonable care or follow the 
accepted standard of care.360 One must wonder how the mentally 
ill patient, especially if prosecuting her case pro se, will find that 
expert and have the financial resources to pay her. 
Even in the plaintiff’s best possible legal outcome, although 
the physician may be held liable for malpractice after harm is 
caused due to use of a drug for an unapproved use, the obvious 
reality is an after-the-fact award of money damages.361 Meanwhile, 
the patient-plaintiff may have sustained irreversible physical 
damage, endured years of lost productivity, and will carry the 
emotional and societal stigma of having taken an antipsychotic. 
The courts do not adequately prevent, or remediate after the 
fact, the harms to nonpsychotic psychiatric patients from taking 
antipsychotics off label. Suggestions that a psychiatric patient’s 
right to pursue litigation can be a meaningful alternative to 
regulation are either disingenuous or lack consideration of the 
difficulties of navigating the U.S. legal system, especially as a 
person living with mental illness. 
Behind closed doors, psychiatrists are allowed broad 
discretion in deciding what is best for individual patients. When 
many psychiatrists are making the same decisions for many 
individual patients without evidence of safety and efficacy, this 
begins to look like sloppy research with many principal 
investigators instead of evidence-based medical practice. There is 
an important ethical obligation to protect our most vulnerable 
patients but apparently little acknowledgement of the widespread 
problem of off-label antipsychotic prescription, or any sense of 
duty to address harms to affected populations. 
 
359. Najib, supra note 101, at 443. 
360. Helm, supra note 90, at 171. 
361. Berry, supra note 16, at 37–38. 
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IV. Who Protects the Most Vulnerable Patients? 
Patients who suffer from severe mental illness should be 
considered potentially vulnerable in both clinical research and 
clinical practice. The federal government does little to protect 
research subjects who may have “impaired decisionmaking 
capacity” or are otherwise “vulnerable to coercion or undue 
influence,” allowing broad discretion to institutional review 
boards in determining if adequate protections are in place.362 
Likewise, U.S. common law allows the treating psychiatrist wide 
latitude when working with psychiatric patients. What might be 
done, on either the federal and state levels (or both), to curb the 
rampant off-label prescription of antipsychotics? 
A.  Why Psychiatrists Need More Regulation 
Despite state informed-consent requirements, some 
physicians habitually fail to properly and adequately warn 
patients about risks and side effects associated with their 
prescription medications.363 Psychotropic medications, and 
antipsychotics in particular, produce numerous adverse side 
effects. Perhaps these are worth the risk to the patient suffering 
from schizophrenia, but for the patient not experiencing 
psychosis, the risks may be unjustifiable where the supposed 
benefit is only to manage—not treat or cure—a mood state. For 
those patients, other alternatives may be available. 
Unfortunately, one cannot depend on the psychiatrist always to 
do what is in the patient’s best interest. 
During the 1973 “Quality of Health Care—Human 
Experimentation” hearing conducted by Senator Edward 
Kennedy,364 certain testimony (while not pertaining to the FDCA) 
illuminated problems that existed, and likely still exist, in 
allowing physicians unbridled discretion in the practice of 
medicine. In opening, Kennedy stated: 
 
362. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107 (2019); 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.111(a)(3), (b) (2019). 
363. Barkus & Derian, supra note 20, at 862. This does not pertain to 
practices related to FDCA, but an analogous framework and lack 
of government oversight are present. 
364. ROTHMAN, supra note 221, at 184 (citing pts. 1–4, Hearings Before 
the Senate Subcommittee on Health and the Committee on Labor 
and Public Welfare, 93d Cong. (1st Sess. 1973)). 
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Human experimentation is part of the routine practice of 
medicine . . . . An absence of vigorous oversight, ‘coupled 
with the most unlimited freedom of action which physicians 
have in the treatment of their patients,’ allowed dangerous 
practices, including the premature use of unproven and 
untested drugs and procedures. The question, is whether or 
not we can tolerate a system where the individual physician 
is the sole determinant of the safety of an experimental 
procedure. After all, it is the patients who must live the 
consequences of that decision.365 
At those same hearings, the then head of the National 
Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), Bertram S. Brown, M.D., 
explained that the practices (even if experimental) of a private 
physician were beyond NIMH’s grasp and control.366 The topic at 
issue was psychosurgery and its use to treat aggressive, 
uncontrollable, violent, and hyperactive behavior that did not 
respond to other forms of treatment.367 Senator Kennedy 
questioned Orlando Andy, M.D., a neurosurgeon from the 
University of Mississippi and a major proponent of the surgery: 
Q: Basically, then, you make an independent judgment 
whether to move ahead on this kind of operation? 
A: Yes. The final decision is always mine in terms of 
whether or not an operation will or will not be done. 
 
365. Id. at 184–85 (citing pt. 1, Feb. 21, 1973, p. 2 of Hearings Before 
the Senate Subcommittee on Health and the Committee on Labor 
and Public Welfare). Rothman includes examples where 
experimental research and the practice of medicine intersect. In one 
case, economically disadvantaged Mexican American women who 
went to a clinic in Texas for contraceptives unknowingly were 
subjects in an experiment “to identify whether the side effects of 
contraceptive pills were physiological or psychological; half the 
women were given contraceptive pills, the other half, placebos, in 
order to allow the investigators to match reported side effects with 
the active agent or the placebo.” Id. “The experiment itself and the 
failure of the medical society to discipline the doctors involved not 
only confirmed the idea that ‘poor minority people’ were 
particularly liable to be abused but also demonstrated, yet again, 
the inability of the profession to police its own members.” Id. 
366. Id. at 186. 
367. Id. 
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Q: Do you have any board or panel that continues to review 
the various bases for the psychosurgery in which you have 
been involved? 
A: No. We don’t have a board of supervisors or 
investigators or peer review type of activity over what we 
are doing.368 
The doctor’s testimony raises the obvious ethical implications 
of one physician having sole discretion to decide when a patient’s 
brain will be surgically altered. With this surgeon, who regularly 
tampered with the human brain in attempts to control antisocial 
behavior, there was no oversight by a peer group or government 
regulatory body.369 What was once done only through 
psychosurgery can now, in essence, be accomplished with 
psychotropic medications. With the effect of sedating and 
controlling thoughts and behaviors of the patient suffering from 
psychosis, for certain psychiatric patients, the numerous SGAs 
can be a valuable resource. But could we endorse a little bit of 
brain surgery to “fix or control” a nonpsychotic patient’s mood, 
behavior or outlook when various alternatives, such as expensive 
but effective psychotherapy, were available? The use of mind-
altering medications instead of a scalpel is less extreme and less 
invasive, yet antipsychotic medications sometimes have life-
altering chronic and irreversible side effects. Perhaps 
 
368. Id. (citing the questioning of Dr. Orlando Andy during “Hearings 
on Human Experimentation,” pt. 2, 23 Feb. 1973, p. 354). 
369. Id. Rothman notes that while Senator Kennedy’s version of the 
legislative proposal calling for the creation of a National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects passed the 
Senate intact, the House had different ideas. The compromise 
resulted in a temporary commission and advisory to the secretary 
of HEW, with no independent enforcement powers. “Even in its 
reduced state, however, the commission represented a critical 
departure. First, it made apparent that the monopoly of the 
medical profession in medical ethics was over. The issues were now 
public and national—the province of an extraordinary variety of 
outsiders . . . . Finally, although the commission was not 
permanent and was charged to investigate not all of medicine but 
only human experimentation, it had a vital and continuing 
presence. When its mandate was about to expire in 1978, Kennedy 
was able to transform it into the President’s Commission for the 
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine.” Id. at 189. 
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psychiatrists’ habitual practice of prescribing antipsychotics off 
label warrants closer scrutiny. 
While there are plenty of honest and well-intentioned 
physicians, “honesty is getting harder all the time.” 370 Whether 
intentional or not, our country has created a medical system “in 
which deception is often not just tolerated but rewarded,”371 and 
through a series of social and legislative changes, medicine has 
been transformed into a business permitted primarily to operate 
within state boundaries and under self-regulation.372 Self-
regulation, occurring via a state’s delegation of oversight 
responsibilities to “the medical profession itself is another way 
states oversee—or decline to oversee—medical practice.”373 Little 
is done within the self-regulating psychiatric-physician group to 
protect vulnerable nonpsychotic psychiatric patients from being 
prescribed dangerous antipsychotics; rather, this physician group 
has made such prescribing practices the standard of care, and has 
made these patients “legally safe” specimens for informal, 
unregulated “clinical drug trials.” 
B.  Congress and FDA Attempted to Close the Loophole 
In 1968, a member of Congress alerted FDA of a medical 
journal article that encouraged the use of Methotrexate—a drug 
approved solely for treating particular cancers—to treat a non-
life-threatening skin condition, psoriasis.374 FDA had authorized 
only “highly limited and tightly regulated investigational use of 
the drug” in the treatment of psoriasis and rheumatoid 
arthritis.375 While major side effects associated with Methotrexate 
(for example, bone marrow suppression, leucopenia, 
thrombocytopenia and anemia) might be outweighed by benefits 
in the treatment of a cancer patient, these were not justifiable for 
 
370. ELLIOTT, supra note 86, at xi. 
371. Id. 
372. Id. 
373. Zettler, supra note 55, at 453. 
374. Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 10, at 321 (citing New Drugs Used 
for Nonapproved Purposes (Methotrexate for Psoriasis), Hearings 
before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 92nd 
Cong. 5 (1971)). 
375. Id. 
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a patient suffering a much less severe condition.376 In 1971, a 
House subcommittee finally initiated hearings to consider the 
unique questions and dangerous situation surrounding 
Methotrexate, a drug legally marketed for restricted purposes 
that was commonly being used to treat a different, non-indicated 
(and thus, non-approved) medical condition.377 
Dissatisfied with FDA’s handling of the issue (opting for a 
physician educational campaign instead of inserting itself into the 
doctor-patient relationship), members of Congress insisted that 
FDA “develop a more coherent position on the Agency’s ability 
to constrain prescriber decisions” in prescribing approved drugs 
off label.378 While FDA’s witnesses asserted authority under the 
FDCA for FDA to limit off-label uses, they conceded that FDA 
officials had wavered on this position in the past.379 Congress 
pressed FDA to establish clear policy regarding off-label use, and 
FDA considered new regulations that would have given FDA the 
ability to interfere directly in medical practice by controlling 
particular off-label uses with which it disagreed. 380 However, “the 
medical community continued its vigorous campaign of 
resistance” to FDA’s appropriate efforts to constrain a 
prescriber’s clinical judgment.381 
Aiming to balance conflicting influences, FDA proposed a 
new rule that would allow it to restrict physician-prescribing 
under certain circumstances, although FDA strongly denied any 
intention to interfere with the practice of medicine.382 The 
proposed rule stated that if FDA “determined that an 
‘unapproved use of a new drug may pose a danger to the patients 
receiving the medication, [then] the agency may confine 
 
376. Id. 
377. Id. Eventually, FDA approved the use of Methotrexate for the 
treatment of severe psoriasis. Gerald Weinstein, Methotrexate, 86 
ANN. INTERNAL MED. 199, 199 (1977). 




382. Id.; see Berry, supra note 16, at 9 n. 36 (citing Legal Status of 
Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs; Prescribing for Uses 
Unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration, 37 Fed. Reg. 
16,503 (1972)). 
Health Matrix·Volume 30·2020 
The Off-Label Loophole in the Psychopharmacologic Setting 
307 
distribution of the drug to specified channels or restrict the 
physicians who are able to prescribe the drug.’”383 Under the 
proposed rule, FDA would have had authority to limit the ability 
to prescribe, dispense or administer certain drugs to physicians 
possessing specified, specialized qualifications.384 This action 
would have impacted physicians by effectively allowing FDA into 
doctors’ offices, limiting their freedom to prescribe as they 
deemed fit.385 
Physicians “vociferously objected” to FDA’s interference with 
physician decisions regarding which lawfully marketed drugs 
would be used, for whom, and for what conditions.386 In an 
attempt to satisfy both physicians and members of Congress, 
FDA backed down,387 taking the position that “its statutory 
authority to control the market introduction and labeling of new 
drugs did not encompass the power to restrict the uses to which 
approved drugs might be put.”388 FDA never issued the final 
rule;389 instead, it issued a series of statements that appeared to 
be an effort “to soothe the medical community,” denying that the 
 
383. Berry, supra note 16, at 9. 
384. Id. (footnote omitted). 
385. Id. 
386. Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 10, at 323, 356 n. 35 (“According 
to David Kessler, FDA ‘was concerned’ about ‘improper 
prescribing,’ but ‘was under great pressure from the American 
Medical Association not to tell the doctor what he or she could 
prescribe.’ Kessler indicated that FDA ‘chose to deal with the 
problem [of off-label prescribing] as an educational matter.’”); See 
also Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in 
Controlling the Practice of Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 175 
(2004) (“Physicians have gone so far as to pursue litigation against 
the government when they viewed FDA initiatives as threatening 
their right to practice medicine without federal interference.”). 
387.  Rodney A. Smolla, Off-Label Drug Advertising and the First 
Amendment, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 81, 90 (2015) (“[O]n the few 
occasions in history in which the FDA has venturesomely 
threatened to cross the fateful threshold into the actual regulation 
of medical practice, the political pushback, led by the medical 
profession, has been so intense that the FDA has beat a swift 
retreat.”); see Teo, supra note 35, at 311. 
388. Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 10, at 322 (citing 37 Fed. Reg. 
16,503 (Aug. 15, 1972)). 
389. Id. at 323. 
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failed proposal had represented any real threat to the doctor’s 
autonomy in prescribing decisions.390 
In 1991, FDA issued a Notice of Intent to withdraw certain 
proposed rules for which no final rule or notice of withdrawal had 
been issued; among the rules in the notice was the one regarding 
restrictions on prescription of certain drugs for uses unapproved 
by FDA.391 Months later, FDA determined that it would not 
withdraw that particular proposed rule but also would not 
proceed to a final rule.392 FDA noted that it had established an 
“Unlabeled Use Task Force” to examine promotion and use of 
prescription drugs for non-approved indications and stated that 
FDA would delay considering the withdrawal of the proposed 
regulation until sometime after the task force had completed the 
review.393 Based on extensive legal research, it appears that 
nothing came of this task force. Further, there is no mention of 
subsequent activities in any of FDA’s public communications or 
in the scholarly legal literature. 
C.  Putting the Public Health Before the Healthcare Professional 
States regulate medical practice, and physician groups hold 
dear the autonomy of their members to practice medicine based 
on best judgments. There are instances, however, where a state 
is not able to adequately regulate a given space or profession. 
When considering whether or not to wield federal power, 
Congress and federal agencies should ask whether a given activity 
implicates national public health concerns that are beyond the 
scope of what individual states properly can address.394 Some 
scholars argue that “Article I, Section 8 [of the U.S. Constitution] 
empowers Congress to enact those policies that individual states 
are structurally ill-suited to resolve as a result of interstate 
 
390. This 1982 “drug bulletin” issued by FDA emphasized that the 
Agency regarded off-label use as “accepted medical practice.” Id. 
n. 38 (citing Use of Approved Drugs for Unlabeled Indications, 12 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. DRUG BULL. 4, 5 (Apr. 1982)); see Zettler, 
supra note 55, at ns. 71, 72. 
391. Berry, supra note 16, at 10 (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 42,668-43,701 
(1991)). 
392. Id. (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 67,440 (1991)). 
393. Id. (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 67,442 (1991)). 
394. Zettler, supra note 55, at 432. 
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externalities.”395 Where activities are beyond the capacity of 
individual states to regulate, federal authority is appropriate and 
permissible.396 While the narrative continues that medical practice 
is an individualized and local endeavor, medical practice 
contributes “to problems that cross state boundaries and require 
nationally coordinated or uniform solutions.”397 The widespread 
prescription of antipsychotics in the nonpsychotic patient 
population is a serious threat to our nation’s public health, and 
setting parameters on the sale, prescription and use of 
antipsychotic drugs is a national concern that crosses state lines. 
1. Progress in the Works on Federal Level 
There is some interest within the federal government to 
address the unbridled use of antipsychotics in the nonpsychotic 
patient population. While federal studies and initiatives do not 
extend to the private health-insurance market or to psychiatric 
treatment paid for by patients out-of-pocket, they provide a 
starting point. 
One federal initiative, The Centers for Education and 
Research on Therapeutics (CERTs), conducts research and 
provides education to advance optimal use of drugs, medical 
devices, and biological products.398 Funded and run as a 
 
395. Leslie Meltzer Henry & Maxwell L. Sterns, Commerce Games and 
the Individual Mandate, 100 GEO. L. J. 1117, 1121–22 n.11 (2012) 
(citing Neil Siegel, Free Riding on Benevolence: Collective Action 
Federalism and the Individual Mandate, 75(3) L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 29 (2012)). 
396. See KATHRYN ARMSTRONG & JENNIFER STAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERVS., R43609, ENFORCEMENT OF THE FOOD, DRUG, AND 
COSMETIC ACT: SELECT LEGAL ISSUES 7 (2018) (noting the FDCA’s 
“requirement that articles be in interstate commerce poses ‘no 
obstacle’ to FDA enforcing the Act with respect to seemingly 
wholly intrastate activities.”). 
397. Zettler, supra note 55, at 479. 
398. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERV., AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE 
RESEARCH AND QUALITY: FY 2012 ONLINE PERFORMANCE 
APPENDIX (2012). The CERTs receive funds from both public and 
private sources, with AHRQ providing core financial support. The 
research conducted by the CERTs program has three major aims: 
(1) increase awareness of both the uses and risks of new drugs and 
drug combinations, biological products, and devices, as well as of 
mechanisms to improve their safe and effective use; (2) provide 
clinical information to patients and consumers; health care 
providers; pharmacists, pharmacy benefit managers, and 
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cooperative agreement by the Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality (AHRQ), in consultation with FDA, the program has 
six research centers and a CERTs Scientific Forum.399 In 2010, 
sixteen States, the Rutgers University Center for Education and 
Research on Mental Health Therapeutics, and Medicaid Medical 
Directors Learning Network (MMDLN) collaborated on a report 
titled “Antipsychotic Medication Use in Medicaid Children and 
Adolescents: Report and Resource Guide From a 16-State 
Study.”400 This report contains data on utilization patterns and 
treatment practices that raise clinical concerns, including 
“polypharmacy, wrong dosages, and the prescribing of 
antipsychotic drugs to very young children.”401 
In 2011, the OIG commissioned a study regarding 
prescription of antipsychotics to Medicaid-covered children to 
ensure the quality of care provided to children receiving 
SGAs.402As a result, in 2015 the OIG made three 
recommendations to CMS, the agency that partially funds State 
Medicaid programs. The OIG recommended that CMS work with 
State Medicaid programs to (1) perform utilization reviews of 
SGAs prescribed to children; (2) conduct periodic reviews of 
medical records associated with claims for SGAs prescribed to 
children; and, (3) consider other methods of enhanced oversight 
 
purchasers; health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and health 
care delivery systems; insurers; and government agencies; (3) 
improve quality while reducing cost of care by increasing the 
appropriate use of drugs, biological products, and devices and by 
preventing their adverse effects and consequences of these effects 
(such as unnecessary hospitalizations). Id. at 32–33. 
399. Id. at 33. 
400. OEI-07-12-00320, supra note 263, at 5. The Rutgers group and 
MMDLN receive funding from the Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality. The 16 collaborating states were Alabama, California, 
Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New 
Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Tennessee, Texas, and Washington. States prominently featured in 
the study were California, Illinois, New York, and Texas. 
401. Id. 
402. Id. at 31. 
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of SGAs prescribed to children, such as implementing peer-review 
programs.403 CMS concurred with these recommendations.404 
The OIG intervention could influence prescribing practices 
because it affected reimbursement policy. Specifically, the 
influence derived from the policies that: (1) “[a]ll State Medicaid 
programs cover outpatient prescription drugs,” provided that said 
outpatient drugs are prescribed for medically accepted 
indications;405 and (2) State Medicaid programs may pay for 
outpatient drugs not prescribed for medically accepted 
indications.406 The Social Security Act defines “medically accepted 
indications” as FDA-approved uses and off-label uses supported 
in one of the compendia.407 At the time of the OIG review, 
only one of the SGAs prescribed to children—risperidone—had 
“medically accepted” indications for use in pediatric patients 
beyond what FDA had approved.408 Now there are more 
antipsychotics designated to have “medically accepted 
indications” for use in children, but still the list of indications is 
far narrower than uses in actual practice.409 Given the alarming 
 
403. Id. at 32–33. 
404. Id. 
405. Id. at 2 (citing the Social Security Act, Pub. L. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286, 
§ 1905(a)(12) (1965)); Prescription Drugs, MEDICAID.GOV (May 
12, 2014), http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-
Information/ByTopics/Benefits/Prescription-Drugs/Prescription-
Drugs.html [https://perma.cc/D8AN-MGBB]; see United States ex 
rel. Polansky v. Pfizer, Inc., 822 F.3d 613, 615 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing 
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d)(1)(B)(i) (2018)). 
406. OEI-07-12-00320, supra note 263, at 5. 
407. Id. (citing § 1927(g)(1)(B)(i)(I)–(III) of the Social Security Act). 
The three compendia are (1) the American Society of Health 
System Pharmacists, Inc.’s American Hospital Formulary Service 
Drug Information, (2) the United States Pharmacopeia—Drug 
Information (or its successor publications), and (3) DrugDEX 
Information System. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r-8(k)(2), (3), (6), 
1395w-102(e)(1), (4) (2018). 
408. Id. n.10 (“Medically accepted indications for risperidone include its 
FDA-approved uses as well as its use to treat (1) behavioral 
syndrome-mental retardation and (2) pervasive developmental 
disorder.”). 
409. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., ATYPICAL 
ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATIONS: USE IN PEDIATRIC PATIENTS 1, 2 
(Oct. 2015), available at https://www.cms.gov/Medicare-
Medicaid-Coordination/Fraud-Prevention/Medicaid-Integrity-
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number of Medicaid-recipient children prescribed antipsychotics 
off-label, it appears that government reimbursement practices are 
lenient and lacking in oversight. 
While federal Medicaid requirements governing the 
prescribing of SGAs to children are deficient, federal and state 
agencies and professional associations, such as the American 
Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, the National 
Committee for Quality Assurance, and the Administration for 
Children and Families, have provided guidance and information 
on prescribing these drugs to child-patients.410 In 2012, the 
Administration for Children and Families released a 
memorandum titled “Promoting the Safe, Appropriate, and 
Effective Use of Psychotropic Medication for Children in Foster 
Care.”411 This memorandum spotlighted three “outlier practices” 
that could signify red flags of inappropriate physician prescribing 
practices of SGAs: (1) prescribing multiple drugs concurrently 
with the antipsychotic; (2) prescribing dosages that are too high; 
and, (3) prescribing SGAs to very young children.412 
Hope for economically disadvantaged nonpsychotic patients 
of all ages who indiscriminately (and perhaps automatically, with 
little forethought) are prescribed antipsychotics, may rest in 




SA5R]. As of October 2015, six atypical antipsychotics had FDA-
approved indications for use in children and adolescents: 
aripiprazole, asenapine, olanzapine, paliperidone, quetiapine, and 
risperidone, for various combinations of Tourette’s disorder, 
schizophrenia, Bipolar I disorder, and irritability with autistic 
disorder. Id. 
410. Id. at 3; OEI-07-12-00320, supra note 263, at 4 n.14 (“The guidance 
discussed here covers all psychotropic drugs—a category that 
includes SGAs and several other types of drugs. Other classes of 
psychotropic drugs include attention deficit/ hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD) drugs, antianxiety drugs, antidepressants, first-generation 
antipsychotics, hypnotics, and mood stabilizers. This study focuses 
specifically on SGAs.”) 
411. Id. (citing ACF, PROMOTING THE SAFE, APPROPRIATE, AND 
EFFECTIVE USE OF PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATION FOR CHILDREN IN 
FOSTER CARE, LOG NO. ACYF-CB-IM-12-03 (Apr. 11, 2012), 
available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/im1203
.pdf [https://perma.cc/U65A-GJAX]). 
412. Id. at 4–5. 
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over 71.6 million individuals were enrolled in Medicaid and the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP).413 This is a sizable 
population that can benefit from federal oversight in this area. 
CMS determines what services and treatments are “reasonable 
and necessary,” and with regard to the elderly and disabled, 
Medicare is supposed to reimburse only for those services that are 
deemed “reasonable and necessary.”414 These payors could change 
their policies, for example by hinging reimbursement for off-label 
antipsychotic drugs on a requirement that manufacturers 
demonstrate safety and efficacy—evidence of reasonableness and 
necessity—through rigorous studies.415 
The federal government may also legally impose certain limits 
on health-care practitioners who are paid through Medicare and 
Medicaid.416 But, as discussed above, the majority of psychiatrists 
in the U.S. do not accept either Medicare or Medicaid; and some 
do not accept insurance at all.417 It is quite possible, however, that 
studies and recommendations like those done by the GAO in 2011 
and OIG in 2015, with regard to child Medicaid recipients and 
off-label antipsychotic prescriptions, could be applicable to 
Medicare recipients in a less direct way. The total number of U.S. 
citizens covered by Part D Medicare coverage, including stand-
 
413. December 2019 Medicaid & CHIP Enrollment Data Highlights, 
MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/program-
information/medicaid-and-chip-enrollment-data/report-highlights/
index.html [https://perma.cc/4LCY-NFNF] (last visited Apr. 6, 
2020). 
414. Zettler, supra note 55, at 470–71 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395g (2018)) 
and 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2018)). 
415. Joshua Wallach & Joseph Ross, Gabapentin Approvals, Off-Label 
Use, and Lessons for Postmarketing Evaluation Efforts, 319 
J.A.M.A. 776, 777 (2018). 
416. Id.; See also Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, 
395 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1975), aff’d sub nom, Ass’n of Am. 
Physicians & Surgeons v. Mathews, 423 US. 975 (1975) (affirming 
a district court holding that setting forth conditions under federal 
Professional Standards Review Law for compensating physicians 
with federal funds under Medicare and Medicaid did not bar 
physicians from practicing their profession and was not so patently 
arbitrary and totally lacking in rational justification as to be 
violative of due process clause of Fifth Amendment, as there was 
no coercion by the government making physicians participate in 
the program). 
417. See generally Bishop et al., supra note 2. 
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alone prescription plans and Medicare Advantage with 
prescription drug coverage, was 39,246,296 as of May 2015.418 
While it may be a viable solution to have the federal government 
impose limits on medical practice,419 history suggests that the 
strong physician lobby would adamantly and effectively oppose 
such an agenda. At this point in time, it is widely accepted that 
federal agencies such as FDA and HHS cannot interfere with the 
practice of medicine; that is relegated to the states.420 HHS, 
however, through CMS, can restrict prescription coverage.421 
While a doctor is free to prescribe an antipsychotic off label 
to a nonpsychotic patient, the government does not need to pay 
for that prescription. While the compendia have strong influence 
on reimbursement of off-label claims, “there is no strict legal 
requirement that these uses be reimbursed under current CMS 
rules and regulations.”422 Were CMS to refuse to pay for these 
drugs, this would be a powerful way for the federal government 
to impose restrictions on the use of antipsychotics without 
directly interfering with the practice of medicine. 
Federal oversight in this area would not automatically 
preempt all state oversight.423 In circumstances of both national 
public-health concerns and inadequate state oversight, a limited 
proposal can provide a solution to expand “federal options for 
addressing public health problems, avoiding ineffective federal 
interference with medical practice, and preserving well-
functioning state regulation consistent with federalism values.”424 
 
418. On Its 50th Anniversary, more than 55 Million Americans Covered 
by Medicare, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. NEWSROOM 
(July 28, 2015), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/its
-50th-anniversary-more-55-million-americans-covered-medicare 
[https://perma.cc/D2EB-MFFB]. 
419. Zettler, supra note 55, at 480–81. 
420. Since the late 1800s, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a 
state’s right to exercise its police powers in regulating the practice 
of medicine. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889). 
421. See Todd, supra note 95, at 434–45. 
422. Paczynski et al., supra note 293, at 143. 
423. Zettler, supra note 55, at 482 (citing GOSTIN, supra note 348, at 4); 
see also COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, 
INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 3 (1988); 
Onyebuchi A. Arah, supra note 348, 235. 
424. Zettler, supra note 55, at 482. 
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As federal government oversight in the area would be in stark 
contrast with existing schemes, such regulation may serve to 
spotlight that area’s significance in public health and educate 
physicians and patients about increased risks or need for 
vigilance.425 
The federal government response to the Opioid epidemic 
provides a good example of HHS stepping in, attempting to 
regulate a pharmaceutical public-health disaster that is spiraling 
out of control. In mid-2016, after two days of hearings, FDA’s 
Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committee 
recommended that physicians be required to complete specialized 
training in order to be able to prescribe Opioids.426 While FDA is 
not required to follow or implement advisory-panel 
recommendations, it often does so.427 This particular mandate, 
however, could not simply be accomplished through the 
regulatory process, but would require congressional action.428 
Given the current political climate that opposes regulation of any 
sort,429 the likelihood of FDA moving forward with the 
recommendations is slim. In a different political climate, however, 
perhaps a similar plan of attack could be implemented by HHS 
to address the problem of antipsychotic use in the nonpsychotic 
patient population.430 
 
425. Id. at 488–89. 
426. Stephen Loiaconi, Physicians Warn Mandatory Opioid Prescription 





428. Id. (“Despite a similar expert panel recommendation in favor of 
mandatory training in 2012, the FDA had opted to make 
educational courses on safe pain prescription voluntary. As of 
March 2015, less than half of the 80,000 doctors the agency wanted 
to complete that training had done so.”). 
429. See Kathy Wagner Hill, The State of the Administrative State: The 
Regulatory Impact of the Trump Administration, 6 EMORY CORP. 
GOV’T & ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 25, 26–7 (2019). 
430. Interestingly, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration (“SAMHSA”), an agency within the U.S. HHS that 
leads public health efforts to advance the behavioral health of the 
nation, and whose mission is to reduce the impact of substance 
abuse and mental illness on America’s communities, advocates for 
shared decision-making. On the SAMHSA website is a link to an 
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2. Reform at State Level—What Could be Done? 
States are in a unique position to foster needed changes in 
the prescribing habits surrounding antipsychotics in the 
nonpsychotic patient population. A desire to keep citizens healthy 
while keeping down costs should incentivize states to seriously 
consider options for intervention, which may include State 
Medicaid policy adjustments. Other areas of influence include 
state legislation and regulation, and the ability of a state to 
modify physician practices through physician state-licensing 
boards. Other options are for states to explicitly define what is 
experimental in medical practice, and how that must be disclosed 
to patients. It may require some creativity to identify what will 
work in a particular state, and how implementation of new policy 
should proceed, but a state-based solution to harms caused by 
off-label prescription of antipsychotics, where FDA refuses to 
intervene, may be one of the best options available for realizing 
meaningful change and reform. 
a. State Medicaid Services 
State Medicaid Services have a compelling interest in 
preventing the needless adverse side effects stemming from 
unnecessary use of antipsychotics in the nonpsychotic patient 
population. The adverse side effects that can and do result from 
use of antipsychotics contribute to increased healthcare claims for 
avoidable physical illnesses directly caused by antipsychotics. 
Physicians should be provided disincentives for unnecessarily 
prescribing antipsychotic drugs, and should be held accountable 
through refusal of payment where Medicaid determines there is a 
lackadaisical attitude in the physician’s prescribing practices. 
In the 2015 OIG report, insufficient or non-existent 
monitoring was the most common quality-of-care issue, identified 
in more than half of claims for SGAs prescribed to Medicaid 
recipient children.431 As a result, the OIG recommended that CMS 
 
online tool ”Considering the Role of Antipsychotic Medications in 
My Recovery Plan” for people using or seeking treatment services 
involving antipsychotic medications, with recommendations on how 
to speak to one’s doctor about the use of antipsychotics in 
treatment. Considering the Role of Antipsychotic Medicine, 
SAMHSA, https://www.samhsa.gov/brss-tacs/recovery-support-
tools/shared-decision-making [https://perma.cc/C5SW-H765] (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2020). 
431. OEI-07-12-00320, supra note 263, at 12. 
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work with State Medicaid programs to perform utilization reviews 
of SGAs prescribed to children, focusing on the children’s ages, 
duration of their treatment with SGAs, and their overall drug 
regimens.432 The OIG review criteria could be useful in crafting 
state guidelines. Specifically, conducting periodic reviews of 
medical records associated with claims for SGAs prescribed to 
children to ensure: (1) clear rationales exist for prescribing the 
SGAs; (2) patients are being properly monitored; and (3) 
children’s dosages are properly adjusted.433 The OIG also 
encouraged states to consider other methods of enhanced 
oversight of SGAs prescribed to children, including implementing 
peer-review programs (through which prescribers 
encourage one another to improve quality of care) and 
undertaking voluntary reporting of the Healthcare Effectiveness 
Data and Information Set (HEDIS)434 measures regarding 
children’s use of antipsychotic drugs or adopting the HEDIS 
measures in State oversight of SGAs.435 
These same guidelines could be extended to adult recipients 
of State Medicaid services who are not suffering from psychoses 
but nonetheless are prescribed antipsychotics off label. And the 
extension of policies to the adult Medicaid population could then 
be a model for new standards of care in the private sector. The 
2015 OIG report is a rich and readily available resource, and its 
thoughtful recommendations could be put to use beyond the 
original focal population. 
b. Other Ideas for State Influence in Addressing Problem 
States could enact laws requiring specific informed consent 
for off-label prescription of antipsychotics, especially prescriptions 
to nonpsychotic patients. Nonpsychotic patients would benefit 
 
432. Id. at 15 (“The previously described guidance and information on 
using SGAs to treat children—such as the utilization guidelines 
developed by the Florida and Texas Medicaid programs— may be 
of use to CMS and to other State Medicaid programs in developing 
guidelines for such utilization reviews.”). 
433. Id. 
434. HEDIS and Performance Measurement, NAT’L COMM. QUALITY 
ASSURANCE, https://www.ncqa.org/hedis/ (last visited Dec. 7, 
2018) [https://perma.cc/6SNX-DGTZ] (“The Healthcare 
Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS) is one of health 
care’s most widely used performance improvement tools.”). 
435. OEI-07-12-00320, supra note 263, at 15. 
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from playing a larger role in decision-making (even by guardians 
or surrogates) regarding the use of antipsychotics. This may be a 
critical juncture for treatment decision-making in that long-term 
adverse side effects might be put into motion, and in some 
instances be irreversible. 
Some states, through legislation, have delineated the general 
disclosure required in certain procedures and treatments, but 
physicians have not been given any clear directive as to precisely 
what must be disclosed to patients.436 Even in these states, 
because the medical community sets its own standards within the 
practice of medicine, physicians still are given latitude in deciding 
what information to disclose to patients.437 States could require 
more, directly through their statutes, or through mandates to 
medical- and psychiatric-licensing boards. 
Closer and systematic attention to informed consent and 
decision-making is required in the context of medical practice.438 
Alone, intent to benefit the patient does not supply sufficient 
justification for an intervention, regardless of whether it is called 
research, innovation, or treatment.439 Consent-related discussions 
regarding the nature, magnitude, and likelihood of benefit—in 
both standard and innovative treatment—are quite often 
insufficient.440 Individuals (patients, parents, or guardians) faced 
with difficult decisions need information about expected benefits 
and the sources of information that allegedly support such 
expectations.441 There must be substantial, candid discussion 
regarding all likely and possible adverse side effects. 
A state’s legislative authority is limited only by the federal 
constitution and the state’s constitution.442 Thus, a state 
legislature that deems it “appropriate to regulate research beyond 
the scope of existing federal regulations is unquestionably free to 
do so as an aspect of its sovereign power.”443 The State of 
 
436. Barkus & Derian, supra note 20, at 862. 
437. Id. 
438. King, supra note 64, at 581. 
439. Id. 
440. Id. at 582 (footnote omitted). 
441. See id. at 581–82. 
442. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 179 (quoting Township of Pine 
Grove v. Talcott, 86 U.S. 666, 676 (1873)). 
443. Id. 
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California has done this by imposing a higher bar for informed 
consent relating to off-label uses.444 In California, physicians are 
required to describe off-label uses as experimental before 
obtaining informed consent from patients.445 Other states should 
consider California’s example in crafting their own heightened 
protections for nonpsychotic psychiatric patients, including the 
designation of off-label prescription of antipsychotics as 
“experimental” and the requirement that physicians include 
patients in meaningful discussion of the risks and the benefits. 
On the other hand, there may be intermediate options that 
“involve[e] intraprofessional peer review and consent guidelines, 
at the level of a division, department, institution, or professional 
association.”446 The OIG recommendations take into 
consideration some of these strategies in implementing controls in 
the prescription of antipsychotic drugs to the nonpsychotic-child 
Medicaid recipient.447 This approach can be extended to and 
modeled by state medical- and psychiatric-licensing boards. 
Through legislation, regulation, and medical-licensing boards, 
a state can regulate what is required of physicians within that 
state’s borders. More stringent informed consent requirements 
will alert a nonpsychotic psychiatric patient that the 
antipsychotic their doctor is about to prescribe has not been 
proven safe or effective for a given condition. By arming the 
patient with knowledge, and requiring a meaningful conversation 
between doctor and patient, the state may substantially influence 
decisions regarding off-label use of antipsychotics. 
c. States Can Impose Regulations on Non-Federally-Funded 
Clinical Research 
As in the case with the California informed consent law, state 
protections may exceed those set by federal law, and what is not 
clinical research according to FDA can be deemed “experimental” 
by a state. Another area open for state regulation is clinical 
research that is not (1) conducted or funded by agencies that have 
adopted the Common Rule;448 (2) under FDA’s exclusive 
 
444. Barkus & Derian, supra note 20, at 863–64. 
445. Id. 
446. King, supra note 64, at 576 (footnote omitted). 
447. OEI-07-12-00320, supra note 263, at 16. 
448. See 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2019). 
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jurisdiction; or (3) conducted at an institution that has agreed, 
in an assurance to the Office for Human Research Protections, 
that all research at the institution will be conducted in line with 
the Common Rule.449 Privately funded research is generally 
outside the purview of federal government regulation, which 
means the federal government cannot know the number of 
Americans who are subjects in private research, influence subject 
recruitment practices, ensure that research subjects are informed 
of risks, or ascertain if these subjects suffer harm.450 Among 
venues listed by the National Bioethics Advisory Commission 
where non-government funded research could take place and 
where federal regulation has no force are private offices of some 
physicians and psychotherapists.451 
Clearly, state law is relevant to the research enterprise, and 
states can regulate privately funded research or any other 
activities within their borders.452 For research endeavors not 
falling within federal jurisdiction, “state law (if any) becomes the 
only legally applicable regulatory regime.”453 When federal law 
does apply to research, it expressly preserves any additional state 
protections. For example, the Common Rule specifically addresses 
preemption: “[t]his policy does not affect any state or local laws 
or regulations (including tribal law passed by the official 
governing body of an American Indian or Alaska Native tribe) 
that may otherwise be applicable and that provide additional 
protections for human subjects.”454 
Further, under the Common Rule, informed consent 
requirements “are not intended to preempt any applicable 
Federal, State, or local laws which require additional information 
to be disclosed in order for informed consent to be legally 
effective.”455 Preserving a role for states in research regulation is 
 
449. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 178. 
450. Id. at 178 (quoting the Nat’l Bioethics Advisory Comm’n). 
451. Id. at 176. 
452. Id. at 179. 
453. Id. at 178 (quoting JACK SCHWARTZ, OVERSIGHT OF HUMAN 
SUBJECT RESEARCH: THE ROLE OF THE STATES IN NATIONAL 
BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION; ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN 
RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS § 3.05 (2001)). 
454. Id.; see Revised Common Rule, 45 C.F.R. Pt. A § 46.101(f) (2019). 
455. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 178. 
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wholly appropriate given that one of a state’s core functions is to 
protect its citizens—including human subjects—from harm.456 
While this may result in greater variability in clinical research 
requirements, which may complicate implementation of multisite 
studies, state interpretations of what constitutes research and 
what informed consent must include provide potential avenues 
for states to step in and offer protections to the scores of 
nonpsychotic psychiatric patients who are prescribed 
antipsychotics off label. 
Besides delineating the scope of medical practice, licensing 
requirements, and medical board disciplinary power, states may 
regulate medical practice in a multitude of manners.457 California, 
for example, requires physicians to distribute to patients 
standardized pamphlets regarding blood transfusions, breast 
cancer, gynecological cancers, silicone implants, prostate cancer, 
and patients’ rights and remedies if they have been in a sexual 
relationship with their therapist.458 States may also impose 
requirements for specific procedures and the timeframes in which 
they must be performed, for example, treating infants with 
eyedrops immediately, within an hour, or within two hours of 
birth.459 Also, each state has mandated newborn medical screening 
tests to detect genetic and metabolic disorders, but the specific 
mandates vary by state.460 States could require certain screening 
 
456. Id.; see Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. St. Highway Comm’n, 
294 U.S. 613, 622 (1935) (“It springs from the obligation of the 
state to protect its citizens and provide for the safety and 
good order of society. Under it there is no unrestricted authority to 
accomplish whatever the public may presently desire. It is the 
governmental power of self-protection and permits reasonable 
regulation of rights and property in particulars essential to the 
preservation of the community from injury”). 
457. Zettler, supra note 55, at 451. 
458. Id. at 452 (citing MED. BD. OF CAL., GUIDE TO THE LAWS 
GOVERNING THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE BY PHYSICIANS AND 
SURGEONS 70–71 (7th ed. 2013), available at http://perma
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459. Id. (citing N.H. REV. STAT. § 132:6 (2006)); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
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§ 109A (West 2003)). 
460. Id. (citing About Newborn Screening: Conditions Screened by State, 
BABY’S FIRST TEST, http://www.babysfirsttest.org/newborn-
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procedures to determine whether use of an antipsychotic would 
be the best first-, second- or third-line defense in treating the 
nonpsychotic patient. States could also require physician 
education hours on the topic of using antipsychotics in the 
nonpsychotic patient population and channel resources to 
awareness-raising campaigns. 
States have many underutilized tools to shape policies and 
practices relating to off-label prescription of antipsychotics to 
nonpsychotic patients. States could get out ahead of the 
escalating off-label prescription of antipsychotics by recalibrating 
the parameters for (1) provision of publicly funded psychiatric 
services (making psychotherapy less costly or free); (2) 
reimbursement policies under State Medicaid (making 
reimbursement contingent on evidence-based justifications for 
treatments, including prescription of off-label antipsychotics); 
and (3) determining what is appropriate and acceptable medical 
practice in the context of nonpsychotic psychiatric patients 
(influencing psychiatrists’ prescribing practices and consideration 
of alternative methods). By doing so, states could wield 
substantial influence in treatment decisions and improve 
outcomes for many individual patients. 
Conclusions and Thoughts on Future Efforts 
Illuminating the incidence of inappropriate and harmful off-
label prescription of antipsychotic drugs and their indiscriminate 
use in the nonpsychotic patient population may also depend on 
efforts of consumer advocacy groups and media reports. In order 
to accurately portray this as a valid concern for all mental-health 
patients in the U.S., it would be prudent to enlist the support of 
liberal, mainstream, and conservative groups and news outlets 
alike. The media could play a critical role in spotlighting this 
mostly under-the-radar issue. If the public knows that 
antipsychotic use is frequent in the nonpsychotic population, and 
oftentimes not in patients’ best interests, public opinion could 
influence the way doctors conduct the practice of medicine. 
Lobbying efforts at the individual state level will be required to 
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effect any sort of meaningful change in how antipsychotics are 
prescribed to nonpsychotic patients and to frame the issue of 
what oversights should be established through state statutory 
mandates, then implemented by medical and psychiatric boards. 
While it is heartening to see that there are both federal and 
state government agencies aware of the problems associated with 
antipsychotic use in the nonpsychotic patient population, and 
that studies and some guidance have been undertaken, follow-
through with purposeful, meaningful action is needed. Further, 
much more must be done to reach and advocate on behalf of the 
millions of patients who pay solo practice psychiatrists out-of-
pocket for treatment. Private health-insurance companies must 
question prescriptions and restrict payment/reimbursement.461 
That alone would have a negative effect on the nonpsychotic 
patient’s pocketbook and might spur discussion between the 
patient and psychiatrist regarding the off-label nature of the 
prescription and the evidence of safety and efficacy—or lack 
thereof. 
Efforts to address widespread off-label use of potentially 
harmful antipsychotics are the responsibility of many, including 
physicians, government regulators, policy makers and advisors, 
public health experts, scholars, politicians, payors, drug 
manufacturers, the media, and patients and their advocates; but, 
it is physicians who “‘wield the prescribing pen.’”462 Medical 
associations and boards strongly resist efforts of non-physicians 
to participate in discussions regarding off-label prescriptions, but 
in performing their duty to self-regulate, these medical 
professionals are falling short. Therefore, invited or not, more 
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